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L O R D  L Y T T O N  
AND 
THE A F G H A N  WAR.  
THE importance of England's mission in the East can hardly be 
exaggerated, nor the results dependent upon its right apprecia- 
tion by British Statesmen. Those Statesmen are responsible to 
the British people, who themselves ultimately share the respon- 
sibility, if they sanction the acts of their representatives. We 
have entered upon a war, the political consequences of which no 
one can foresee; but it will most probably entail a great loss of 
life, and certainly a large expenditure of money. In this crisis 
any individual, however humble, who, like the writer of this 
pamphlet, has been employed on the scene of action in former 
days, and has filled official situations which have given him the 
opportunity of studying the question, may be pardoned if he ven- 
ture to place before his countrymen the conclusions at which he 
has arrived. I f  he can contribute in the slightest degree to the 
formation of a sound public opinion, if he can enforce caution, or 
correct error, his object will be attained. He has no party purpose 
in view. The honour, the justice, the interests of England, and 
the welfare and prosperity of India, are too dear to him to allow 
- 
of his descending into the arena of party strife. He  feels assured 
that the majority of thoughtful Englishmen only desire to have 
A 
brought before them the real facts of the case, to throw their 
influence into what they believe to be the right cmse. But they 
must have the whole case, and all the documents necessary to 
enable them to form an impartial judgment upon it, and not a 
mere statement of the case on one side. Has the whole case- 
have all the requisite documents-been laid before the public ? 
No unprejudiced person can answer these questions in the affirma- 
tive. I s  it not a fact that authentic and official documents were 
long withheld, while one-sided statements and memoranda by 
men holding high positions under the Government, and therefore 
supposed to have access to the best means of information, were 
put forward from time to time to bias the public mind ? Have not 
inspired telegrams, containing exciting intelligence calculated to 
arouse public indignation, been transmitted from India only to be 
diluted or explained away shortly afterwards ? W e  were told, for 
instance, that the letter of Sher AX, the full text of which was 
conveyed ill the Viceroy's telegram of the 19th of October, but not 
published until recently, was of an insolent and defiant nature. 
Why  was it not given to the public at once, so as to enable 
competent persons to  judge for themselves whether the interpre- 
tation put upon it by Lord Lytton was borne out by its tone and 
language, and why were not the letters from our officers to his 
. 
officials to which Sller Ali referred also given? Witllout these 
letters of which he complained no fair judgment could be come to 
as to the provocation which led to the Amir's conduct. ' W e  have 
Eher Ali's letter now at page 252 of the "Afghanistan Papers," 
and it  is characterized by Lord Lytton as " intentionally rude, 
collreying a direct challenge, and that any demand for an apology 
mould only expose US to fresh insult." I n  order to form a correct 
opinion upon it, in common justice to the Amir, the Persian text 
ought to be submitted to ripe Oriental scholars, of whom there 
are several in the Council of India. But taking the English 
translation as it stands, few impartial persons will, it is believed, 
support Lord Lytton's view ; and even the Ministers themselves, 
by very properly directing that a further communication should 
be forwarded to Sher Ali, would seem to have cast doubt on the I 
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Viceroy's hasty conclusion. We have not before us, even now, all 
the informati011 which would enable the English people to form a 
judgment as to the principles and policy which hwe plunged the 
country into what many consider to be an unnecessary, impolitic, 
and unjust war. Without having any voice on a question in 
which their interests are so deeply concerned, the nation has been 
compelled to take a tremendous leap in the darlr. The most 
complete success must be attended by all the horrors evils 
which follow in the train of war. Only the clearest m d  most 
undoubted necessity could justify the recourse to that e&eme 
arbitrament. Did that necessity exist ? and if it did exist vhere 
is it going to lead the country? Will not our difficulties be 
increased rather than diminished by the attainment of the ends 
~roposed by the policy of the present Government? Shall me not 
be in a worse position, both in a military and a political point of 
view, even if the most entire success crown our efforts? These 
are questions of paramount importance to the people of England, 
requiring the utmost calmness and impartiality to  come to a wise 
and right decision. But can a calm and deliberate judgment be 
hoped for, when some of the noblest of our citizens, and those 
the best capable of giving advice, are denounced with bitterness 
because they venture to resist the popular feeling, and strive to 
instruct the public mind? Such efforts are not incompatible with 
true patriotism; on the contrary, they have their origin in a 
sacred jealousy of their country's honour and reputation, and in 
a solemn sense of Christian duty. 
But independently of the great principles of justice and 
morality, which are involved in this question of the War in 
Afghanistan, there are other questions of the highest inlportanoe, 
in relation to the new mode of governing India, which it  behoves 
the English Parliament and people to look in the face, and at 
the proper time to exact a full explanation. Every day more 
and more disclosures are made of information withheld, 
of constitutional forms infringed and disregarded, and of a 
system of personal government inaugurated in the highest degree 
dangerous to our Indian Empire. We have the letters of those 
eminent Indian functionaries, Sir Arthur Hobhouse and Sir 
Henry Norman. We  have the suppressed minutes of Sir 
William Muir, replete with sound sense and ripe experience of 
our Inclian administration. 
What does Sir Arthur Hobhouse write?- 
"Whether the mode of conclucting Inclian affairs during Lord 
Salisbury's tenure of office has been in accordance with law, with 
previous practice, or with public policy, is a question fraught, au I think, 
with interest and importance to ihe nation, but quite apart from 
personalities." 
What food for reflection, what cause for anxiety, does not 
this pregnant sentence (emanating from one who has held with 
distinction the highest legal office in India) suggest to the minds 
of those conversant with Indian affairs. 
John Mill said truly :- 
iLThe great constitutional security for the good government of India 
lies in the forms of business." " The Minister, placed in office by the  
action of political party, except in very rare cases, can possess little or 
no knowledgo of India." 
The Viceroy, selected from similar party considerations, is, 
generally, equally inexperienced in Indian affairs. Both are 
assisted by Councils composed of eminent men, who have filled 
the highest offices in India, and bring to their work a thorough 
knowledge of alI branches of Indian administration and of the  
peculiar usages, feelings) and prejudices of the people of India. 
English Statesmen of large minds, and comprehensive European 
experience, collect the opinions of their distinguished Councillors, 
weigh them well, and come to their own conclusions. This has 
hitherto been the practice of the greatest Indian Viceroys, a ~ d  of 
the ablest Secretaries of State for India. Where differences of 
opinion have existed, the dissentients in the Councils have had 
the opportunity of recording their views, and in this manner both 
sides of the various important questions which constantly arise 
in the government of India have been placed before Parliament 
and the country. Even the bitterest opponents of the East 
India Company dmays admitted its excellence as a Government 
of record. 
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It appears that this salutary check on hasty and inconsiderate 
action has been lately set aside, or at all events greatly curtailed, 
both at home and abroad, and the evil results are already too 
apparent. Lord Salisbury testifies, in the House of Lords, that 
" in industry, caution, and sound hard discretion Lord Lytton has 
not been exceeded by any Viceroy, who preceded him." Gibbon 
writes:--" Abu Rafe, servant of Mahomet, testifies to the wielding, 
as a buckler, by Ali of the ponderous gate of a fortress, which he 
and seven other men could not lift." Gibbon adds :-(' Abu Rafe 
was an eye-witness, but who will be witness for Abu Rafe?)' 
After a perusal of the ((Afghanistan Correspondence," especially of 
the conversations of the Viceroy with Nuwab Atta Mahomed 
Khan, it will require more than Lord Salisbury's testimony to 
convince the thinking portion of the English people of the 
" caution and sound hard discretion of Lord Lytton," 
811 sorts of doctrines have been put forward by the Press, and by 
the writers who support the Imperial policy of the present Govern- 
ment, in reference to  our relations with the Bmir of Cabul, and, 
by implication, with the Native States of India. Some of theso 
doctrines, enunciated by men of great intellectual power, appear to 
be so erroneous, and so opposed to  the principles whioh have 
hitherto generally guided the policy of the British Government, 
that it behoves every man who has been connected with the 
administration of India, and who holds strong opinions of their 
dangerous tendency, to protest against their promulgation and 
p" adoption. Amongst erroneous assumptions it has been persistently 
f i rmed that the Amir of Cabul has no claim to independence, 
because his father Dost Mahomed and he himself have received 
subsidies fkom the Indian Government. Has England never sub- 
.# 
sidized European 8tates ? What of Prussia and Podugal ? 
Frederick of Prussia, in the seven years' war, through our subsidies 
kept the French armies employed near their own frontier, and 
thus enabled England to maintain her superiority in India and in 
America. Lord Chatham hunself said :-" I have conquered 
America in Germany." Portugal preserved her very existence 
by the i d  of the subsidies of England, but neither Prussia nor 
Portugal on that account ceased to be regarded as independent 
Parers. There is, howeyer, an illustration nearer a t  hand to Cabul. 
Tlie Shah of Persia, through a long series of years, received sub- 
sidies from the Indian Goreri~ment, but no one ever maintained 
that Persia therefore forfeited her independence. 4 
Sir Jamcs Stcl~l~en, in his discussion of the Afghan question, 
has laid do~j-n principles ~f-llich would seem to override the rights 
of wery Bsi:itic State, and plncc them entirely at the mercy and 
discr~tir~~l of the British Goyernrne~lt. Our relations with these 
stntc.;," he n-rites, "must be determined by the fact that we are 
~ x ~ ~ c e d i 1 1 ~ 1 ~  po~verf~il and higllly civilized, and d that they are 
o~mpamtirclg \i~eak, and 11aX bbarbwous." ' But it will be 
better to quote the nhole passage, which is couched in a tone 
of national self-assertion calculated to wound the feelings and 
cscite the rcscntme~lt of all Native Princes and Asiatic Rulers, 
whether within our own territories or in countries adjacent to 
them. 
If an Englishman, on perusal of these paragraphs, feels his 
blood tingle and his pulse beat high with indignation at such 
I despofic doctrines, what must be the feehgs of Princes like Sindia 
and Holknr, or of such edi6htened Statesmep as Sir Salar Jung 
and Sir AIndara Rao, or of "he Amir of Cabul, who look at such 
questions from quite a different point of view, and take their stand 
upon the obligations of treaties and the broad rules of morality 
and justice, which are as applicable to the weak as to the strong ? 
These rules, as John Mill says, " are as binding on communities 
as on individuals ; and men are not warranted in doing to other 
countries, for the supposed benefit of their own country, what they 
I 
would not be jusaed in doing to other men for their own benefit." 
Sir James Stephen writes :- 
"I do not admit that England, Russia, China, the Amir of Cabul, the 
Khan of Khelrtt, the Akhoond of Swat, the Nono of Spiti, and the Khan 
of Khiva, form an assemblage of practically equal moral persons, whose 
relations are to be discovered by consulting Grotius and his successors. 
Fictions cannot be stretched beyond a certain point. England, Russia, 
and China may treat on equal terms, but the other Rulers whom I have 
mentioned are simply the chief Rulers of clans, more or less extensive and 
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powerful, who, though not dependent upon us in the sense of any defi- 
nite duties or allegiance t o  the Queen, must be dealt with on the uncles- 
standing t h a t  they occupy a distinctly inferior position-their inferiority 
consisting mainly in this, that  they are not to be permitted to follow a 
course of policy which exposes us to danger. This is the footing on 
which every State enclosed i n  the British dominions is practically 
treated. It appears to me t h a t  it is the only principle on which the 
adjacent Powers can be treated. Our relt~tions with Sindia, are, of course, 
different from our relations with the Al~lir of Cabul, as they are different 
from our relations with Holkar and the Nizmn; but, a t  bottom, our rela- 
tions with all ofthem stand on the same basis. They are all deterruined 
by the a c t  that we are excaerlillgly poiirerfnl and higl~ly civilized, and 
that tlloy are cornp:tratively weak and llnlf barb~rous.'" 
It is very convenient for this sort of argument to lump 
together powerful nations and insignificant ststates, and to drag in 
personages whose names, perhaps even in India, are not known to 
one man in a thousand unless specially connected with them. 
Who, until lately, except officers employed on the North-West 
frontier, or those whose official duty i t  is to supervise Indian 
affairs, could give you authentic information as to the power and 
position of the Akhoond of Swat ? 
And mho is the Nono of Spiti ? The very mention of such 
a potentate seems to throw a shade of ridicule over a very grave 
question. It was a source of amusement to frontier officers a few 
years ago, when the Supreme Government penned a despatch, 
intimating to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that the 
penal code was to be introduced into the territories of the Nono 
of Spiti. The Lieutenant-G overnor had a sketch made of this 
redoubtable potentate in his primitive costume, of a single cloth 
round his loins (commonly termed a langoti), with his plough 
on his shoulders, and his two little daughters carrying the seed, 
on their way to their agricultural labours.  his sketch he sent 
into Government, and nothing more was heard of the introduction 
of the penal code. To place this head man of a wild valley in 
the Himalaya mountains, with an income of probably not more 
than three pounds a month, in the same categoiy as the Amir 
of Cabul, requires great confidence in the ignorance of those to  
whom the argument was addressed. 
Mr. Elphinstone mites that the Afghans appear to have been 
entirely independent until the beginning of the seventeenth 
century. They then paid tribute to Persia; but at the com- 
mencement of the eighteenth century they conquered Persia, and 
established a short-lived Afghan dynasty, which was overthrown 
by Nadir Shah. I n  1747, ten years before Clive won the battle 
of Plassey, Ahmed Shah Abdallee was crowned King of Cabul. 
Half-a-century later, one of the first political questions with 
which Lord Wellesley 'had to grapple, on his arrival at  Calcutta, 
was the advisability of forming a defensive alliance between all 
the existing Powers of Hindostan, to resist an expected invasion 
of India by Zemaun Shah, King of Cabul. 
On the 17th of June, 1809, the British Government con- 
cluded a treaty of alliance and co-operation with Shah Shuja. 
Then came the ill-omened tripartite treaty between Shah Shuja, 
Runjeet Sing, and the British Government, dated 20th July, 1838. 
i On the 30th March, 1855, another treaty was made with the 
Amir, Dost Mahomed, on terms of perfect equality. There was 
no infringement of his independence, no implied underst anding 
that he occupied a " distinctly inferior position," or the British 
officers entrusted with the negotiations might have found greater 
difficulty in bringing them to a favourable conclusion. Have we 
treaties of this nature with the Akhoond of Swat or with the 
Nono of Spiti ? The principles put forward by Sir James Stephen 
are full of danger, and tend to destroy confidence in the good 
faith and fair dealing of the British 'Government. They would 
not have been tolerated in the days of the East India Company, 
and they would have found no favour in the eyes of the great 
Statesmen like Malcolm, Munro, and Elphinstone, who illustrated 
the Oompany3s rule. It is not too much to say that those ~ t i t e s -  
men never could have won their diplomatic triumphs in their 
dealings with Native States if such principles had guided their 
conduct. A distinguished member of the Council of India, Sir 
Erskine Perry, possessing a knowledge of Indian affairs, and, it 
may be added, of European politics, surpassed by few, thus re- 
cords his protest against these principles :- 
'L I will only say, as a jurist, that  I have been shocked at the doctrine 
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lately put forth by high legal authority, that the main principles of in- 
ternational law are not applicable to the East. Those principles are 
founded on large views of morality and justice, and if it  is forbidden to 
a civilized Power in Europe to  use poisoned weapons, to shell defenceless 
towns, to massacre or enslave prisoners, to  invade a weak State because 
t h e  possession of it would be convenient to the captor-according to my 
judgment these proceedings are equally forbidden to a civilized Power 
in  Asia." 
This doctrine of the unlimited attributes of the British 
Government, as the paramount Power of India, t o  deal as it 
chooses not only with every Native State enclosed within its 
dominions, but also " with adjacent Powers," to be, in fact, sole 
judge in its own cause when disputed questions arise, which are 
t o  be decided according to its own interests," was, soon after its 
promulgation, justly repudiated by Lord Northbroolr, whose ad- 
ministrative ability, prudent, well-balanced mind, and long official 
training in the study and supervision of Indian affairs, pointed 
him out as one peculiarly fitted to preside over our Indian 
Empire. It is right to observe that Sir James Stephen subse- 
quently explained and considerably modified the language of his 
first letter, and, to show his feelings about justice, quoted from a 
speech made by him in Calcutta, in which he says :- 
bL I believe that  the real foundation on which the British power in 
this country stands, is neither military force alone, as some persons 
cynically assert (though certainly military force is one indispensable 
condition of our power) ; nor even that affectionate sympathy of the 
native population, on vhich, according t o  a more amiable, though not, 
I think, a truer view of the matter, some think our rule ought to rest 
(though it is hardly possible to overrate the value of such sympathy, 
where i t  can by any meails be obtained). I believe that the real founda- 
tion of our power will be found to be an inflexible adherence to broad 
principles of justice, common to all persons, in all countries, and all 
ages, and enforced with unflinching firmness in favour of and against 
evcry one who claims thoir benefit, or who presumes to violate them, no 
matter who he may be.'' 
It is not intended to impute to Sir James Stephen any in- 
difference to justice. But his original statement conveyed t o  
such acute and practised minds as those of Lord Grey and of Lord 
Northbrook (and therefore, it may be supposed, to many European 
and .Asiatic minds) a meaning utterly repugnant to that affec- 
tionate sympathy," to vhich he justly attaches so much value, 
and seamed to be a defence of high-handed principles of despotism, 
put forward for the sake of justifying our invasion of Afghanistan. 
The very fact of explanation being required demonstrates the 
necessity of caution, on the part of those capable of influencing 
the public mind. Opinions thus hastily given, which are liable to 
misconstruction, may lay the foundation of distrust and disaffection 
in the minds of the Chiefs and Princes of India. Even now the 
sting remains, and the doctrine is laid down, that with regard to 
the Native States of India, and to the adjacent Powers, no law 
nor rule exists to regulate the relations between them and the 
British Government but that which the British Government may, 
to the best of their judgment, deem most conducive to the happi- 
ness and lasting peace of Lits subjects and its neighbours, the 
grounds for this Imperial doctrine being that "none of them is 
strong enough or civilized enougl~ to be really or permanently 
independent." 
This is no new doctrine. I n  the days of annexation i t  was 
propounded, time after time, by those who supported the policy of 
absorbing the Native States, and bringing all Hindostan under 
British rule.. But even Lord Dalhousie himself, whose Imperial 
proclivities were unmistakeable, in his minute of the 27th May, 
1851, on the affairs of the Nizam, recorded his strong opinion in 
reprobation of so dangerous a doctrine. H e  writes :- 
" I recognize no mission confided to  the Brit,ish Government which 
imposes upon it the obligation, or can confer upon it the right, of 
deciding authoritatively on the existence of native independent Sovereign- 
ties, and of arbitrarily setting them aeide, vhenever their sdministra- 
tion may not accord with its own views, and although their act,s in no 
way affect the interests or security of itself or its allies. Still less can 
I recognize any such property in  the acknowledged supremacy of the 
British Government in India, as can justit'y i ts  rulers in disregarding 
the positive obligations of international  contract,^, in order to obtrude 
on Native Princes and their people a system of subversive interference, 
which is unwelconle alike to people and to Prince." : 
It has been well observed that "the eternal principles of 
right and wrong should influence us in dl parts of the world." 
The acts of England are not done in a corner. The eyes of all 
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eyes of all 
nations are upon her. The millions of India are as sensitive to 
the infringement of the unalterable laws of justice as the more 
enlightened communities of Europe. Not only in Europe and in 
Asin, but even in Africa, deeds which redound to the creclit or 
discredit of the British nation are discussed. Shortly after the 
unjust annexatioll of Sinde, Dr. Richardson, a traveller in Central 
Africa, relates the following circumstance :- 
" Tlie conversntion was stopped by the entrance of a reinarlrable 
personage, the quasi Sultan of Ben Walid. Having heard that I was 
present, he said : ' Cllristian, do you lrnow Sinde? ' ' Yes,' I said. He 
then tlurnecl and said something to the people in the Gliadarliai 
language. I afterwards learned it was, ' You see these Christians are 
eating up all the S/lussalman countries.' He then abruptly turuecl to me, 
Why do the English go there, and eat up all the Mussulmans? 
afterwards you will come here.' I replied, ' Tlle A~nirs were foolish, 
and engaged in conspiracy against the Engl i~h  in India, but the Mussul- 
mans in Sinde enjoyed the same privileges as the Ei~glish themselves.' 
That is what you say,' he rejoined ; and then continued, 'Why do you 
go so far from home to take other people's countries from them?' I 
replied, ' The Turks do the same : they collie to the desert.' ' Ay, you 
wish to be such oppressors as the Turlcs.' He then told me not to talk 
any more, and a painful silence continued for some time?' 
But if bad deeds make their mark for evil, and cast discredit 
on the British name, good deeds exercise a sovereign influence 
for good, and pave the way for the blessings of civilization and 
Christianity in a manner little imagined by superficia.1 observers 
of the course of events. The wisdom of British Statesmen, the 
heroism of British soldiers, the self-devotion of British mission- 
aries, have all, under God, contributed to build up our magnificent 
Empire in the East. The moral force of individual character 
exercises unbounded sway over impulsive, half-civilized Asiatics. 
The line of demarct~tion is broken. down between races, 
antagonism subsides, prejudices melt away, and it may be said of 
these beriofactors of mankind, "Fragrance on their footing treads," 
and their good deeds live after them. Outram won the hearts of 
the Bheels ; Edwardes subjugated, without bloodshed, the wild 
tribes of the valley of Bunnoo. I n  the same manner the gran- 
deur and simplicity of the character of Monntstuart Elphinstone 
created, as a native author states, " a most wonderful and noble 
reversion of respect for the generosity, truth, and justice of the 
British nation in the minds of the Afghan Chiefs and people." 
Those who conversed with Afghans, forty and fifty years ago, 
can well remember the honour awarded to the name of 'cUlfi.ish- 
teen," the traditions of whose splendid mission had been handed 
down fiom father to son amongst these wild but impressionable 
mountaineers. 
Alas ! the more bitter memories of the unfortunate Cabul 
expedition changed the currents of thought, and heaped 
up a wealth of hatred and execration on the British name 
in afghanistan, while " disasters, unparallelled in their extent, 
unless by the errors in which they originated," seventeen 
millions of treasure wasted, thousands of lives fruitlessly expended, 
left traces 111 British recollections not to  be wiped out even by 
the brilliant victories which restored the 1.ustre of British arms. 
A long interregnum ensued, during which Afghanistan remained a 
sealed book to British influence, until, on the 30th March, 1855, 
a treaty was concluded with Dost Mahomed by Sir John Law- 
rence, under the instructions of Lord Dalhousie. Subsequently, 
in January 1857, in consequence of the war between England 
and Persia, an agreement was entered into wlth Dost Mahomed, 
by which he undertook to defend Heriit against Persia; and 
for this purpose the British Government furnished him with 
money and arms. 
It was Lord Canning's desire that these negotiations should 
be intrusted t o  Sir Herbert Edwardes, who, as Commissioner of 
Pesha~vur, had taken a leading part in bringing about a reconcilia- 
tion with the Afghans. Lord Lawrence, in whose character 
magnanimity and self-abnegation are conspicuous, entertaining, as 
he did, the affectioc of a brother for Sir Herbert, and placing the 
highest value upon his ability and services, was quite willing to 
give way, although the conduct of negotiations of such moment 
naturally have devolved upon him, as Chief Commissioner 
of the Punjab. But an unexpected obstacle arose to this arrange- 
ment. Dost Mahomed, with whom the name of John Lawrence 
was as a household word, would treat with no one else, and 
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refused to attend the meeting unless this was conceded. No doubt, 
besides the feeling of personal regard, there mas the idea that 
his dignity would be compromised if he met an officer of in- 
ferior grade. These negotiations were therefore carried out by 
Lawrence and Edwardes, and the important consequences resulting 
from them were patent to all the world during the eventful years 
of the Sepoy mutiny, when a formidable inroad of Afghan hordes 
might have added greatly to our difficulties. It mas at  this 
meeting that the following affecting incident occurred :- 
" See these coarse garments, said Dost Mahomed, opening his vest, 
how old and patched they are. Are these the proper robes for a ruling 
Prince? This shawl around my head is the sole piece of finery I possess. 
I have no money whatever. My sons and my Chiefs take everything I 
have. They leave me nothing, and they tear me into pieces with their 
dissensions. I live from hand to mouth among them, a life of expediente. 
I wish to Heaven that I could turn Faqueer, and escape from this heavy 
lot." 
Dost Mahomed remained our staunch friend until the day of 
his death, on the 9th of June, 1863. He had made himself 
master of Her6t by a vigorous attacl;, not altogether unaided by 
the garrison, on the 27th of Nay. On the death of Dost 
Mahomed, Sher Ali commenced to  rule, having been nominated 
heir-apparent some years before, on the demise of his brother, 
Gholam Hyder; but from the very beginning of his reign he met 
I with determined opposition from a party headed by his elder 
brothers, Mahommed Mzal Khan and Mahommed Azim Khan. 
Then succeeded a revolutionary period in Afghanistan, lasting 
' 
about five years, on which it is not necessary t o  dwell. 
The Government of India, in accordance with the settled 
policy of the Government at home, kept aloof from any inter- 
ference with Afghan internal affairs. Dost Mahomed himself 
counselled this line of action. " If you wish," he said, (L to be 
friends with the Afghans, beware of meddling with their intestine 
quarrels." The object of the British Government was to leave 
the choice of a Ruler to the Afghan nation; the probability was that 
the most popular, the most able, and the most powerful of the , 
Barukge Chiefs, the fittest for the position, mould gain the 
ascendency. Ostensible British aid would not increase his popu- 
larity. It might contribute t o  his temporary success, b u t  it 
could not maintain him upon the throne without a continuous 
and exhausting drain of British resources, both of m e n  and 
money. Moreover the proverbial fickleness and faithlessness of 
Afghan Chiefs would probably render him a broken reed very 
likely to pierce the hand in the hour of need. Except where 
their own interests are maf;erially concerned, all history and all 
experience are against the notion that Afghan Rulers will ever 
prove '' grateful and eficient allies." It must be recollected also 
that  many of the acts of Sher Ali, though quite in accordance 
with the Afghan character, were not such as the British Govern- 
ment could approve. It was not a t  all improbable that h e  might 
have so conducted himself as to have estranged the majority of 
the Afghan Chiefs and people. I f  me had espoused his cause 
in the earlier part of the contest, we might have found ourselves 
supporting a tyrannical Ruler against the wishes of the Mghan 
nation. In 1868 Sher Ali finally established his authority in 
Afghanistan. The Viceroyalty of Lord Lawrence was then 
coming to an end; but one of his last acts before he  quitted India 
was to enter into friendly relations with Sher Ali, by inviting 
him to a Burbar, and by promising to aid him with money 
and arms. The important letter of Lord Lawrence, of the 
9th January, 1869, written on this occasion, shows the basis of 
our subsequent diplomatic relations with Sher Ali. I' Lord 
Lamrence writes :- 
" I am leaving the country almost immediately, and am handing over  
tho high office of Viceroy and Governor-General to m y  successor. But 
the policy which I have advisedly pursued with regard to the affairs of 
Afghanistan is one wliich I have entered on with anxious deliberation, 
and wbich has commanded the assent and approval of Her Majesty 
tho Queen of England, and as long as yo11 continue, by your actions, t o  
evince a real desire fbr the alliance of the British Government, yon have 
nothing to apprehend in the way of a change of policy, or of our inter- 
ference in the internal affairs and admini~t~ration f your 
a Syed Noor Mahorned; at the conference with Sir Lewis Pel ly,  
quotes passages from this letter,+ m d  refers especially to Lord 
Lawrence's knowledge of "the circumstances of Afghanistan." 
"Its  good and evil were clearly known to him." ' H e  states 
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expressly " the acquiescence and satisfaction of the Bmir in the 
policy of Lord Lawrence and of Lord Msyo." 
"Our opinion," he says, " is the same as that from the time of the 
late  Amir and Lord Lawrence to the time of the Ulnballit Durbar, and 
till the arrival of the present Vicemy has always been mentioned in our 
past correspondenca, and we are h m l y  of those opinions now. Thcre- 
fore 1 1 0 . ~  can we consent to the addition of such hard conditions, the 
performance of which in Afghanistan will be impossible, as we can show 
b y  many proofs ? " 
These hard conditions were the location of British officers in 
a f g h a n  territory, on which Lord Lytton peremptorily insisted. 
I t  was left to  Lord Mayo, who succeeded Lord Lav-rence on the 
1 2 t h  January, 1189, to carry out the arrangements with Sher 
Ali. Hence the Umballa Durbar which took place in March 
1869. Sher Al i  preferred a great many requests with which 
Lord Mayo did not think proper to comply. The object the Amir 
had chiefly at heart was the recognition of his son Abdulla Jan 
as his heir. To this the Viceroy would not listen, neither mould 
he consent to  make a Treaty offensive and defensive, nor grant a 
fixed subsidy ; but he promised that British officers should not be 
stationed in Afghanistan, and on this point Sher Ali, like his 
father before him, laid the greatest stress. Not, perhaps, that 
he had personally so great an objection ; but he h e w  well that 
such a concession on his part mould do him harm in the eyes 
of his ignorant and fanatical Chiefs and people. The pomer of 
Afghan Rulers is never sufficiently stable t o  allow of their giving 
a handle to insurrectionary movements, especially in the direction 
of religious bigotry. Although disappointed in many respects, 
there is no doubt Sher Ali returned to Cabul from the Umbda 
Durbar more friendly to the British Government than before. 
Lord Mayo's princely courtesy and hank genial demeanour made 
a deep impression on the Barukzye Chief, and produced the 
happiest results. That this friendly feeling lasted wtil Lord 
Mayo's death, the touching letter Sher Ali wrote on the occasion 
of that mournful event sufficiently testifies. This letter was 
addressed to the Acting Viceroy. In it Sher Ah writes :- 
'' The unvarying friendship and kindness displayed towarda me by 
him who is now no more had induced me to determine, if the affairs of 
Afghanistan ct t  the time permitted the step, to accompany His Excel- 
lency on his return to England, so that I might have obtained the 
gratification of a personal interview with Her Majesty the Queen, and 
derive pleasure from travelling in the countries of Europe. Before the 
eternally-predestined decrees, however, men must bow in silence." 
No one can peruse this letter without the conviction that 
sympathy and right feeling are not wanting in the Amir's 
character, and that by wise forbearance and treatment he might 
have been moulded to our own purposes, and our relations with 
p' him placed upon a satisfactory footing. The defenders of Lord 
Lytton's policy have endeavoured to show that the estrangement 
, *  
of Sher Ali dates from a period much earlier than the Umballa 
Durbar. A certain feeling of resentment probably did at  one 
time exist in his mind, because the British Government had not 
aided him In his contest for the throne. I t  is clear, however, from 
the tone of this letter, and from other evidence, that this feeling 
had almost entirely disappeared, owing to the measures initiated 
by Lord Lawrence, and carried out with such tact and judgment 
by Lord Mayo. 'soon after the Umballa Durbar the mission of Sir 
Douglas Porsyth to St. Petersburgh occurred, and a lengthened 
diplomatic correspondence was commenced, mhich ended, during 
the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, in the Russian Government 
accepting the definition of the territory of Mghanistan, as pro- 
posed by the Government of India, by which arrangement Sher 
Ali acquired a greater security with respect to the Northern 
boundary of his dominions than he had ever before possessed. It 
is desirable here to draw special attention to the wise step adopted 
by Mr. Gladstone's Administration, at the suggestion of Lord 
Lamence's Government, in initiating these friendly negotiations. 
A frank interchange of the views of England and Russia on the 
affairs of Central Asia and Afghanistan ensued, which resulted in 
a distinct understanding that both Governments should exert 
all their influence to introduce peace and order into these troubled 
regions. The £ruits of this good understanding were manifant on 
many occasions. W e  read, in Sir John Strachey's minute, dated 
30th April, 1872 :- 
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" To Rutrsian influence in Bokliara was due the prompt of a 
party of Bokhara troops who had crossed the Oxus in the winter of 1869. 
To the restraining ]land kept by Russia on the Afghan refugees in 
Turkestan is t o  be attributed the absence of any attempt on their part to 
shake the throne of the Amir. When the most formiclablo of those 
refugees, Abdool Rllhman, once openly represeated that it would be for the 
intelrnest of Russia to assist him in conquering the throne of Cabul, General 
Von Ihufmann replied that hospitality had been afforded him on con- 
sideration of his destitute circumsta,nces, and not as an enorlly of England, 
or a pretender to the throne of Cabul. General Von Ksufmann llimself, 
in the spring of 1870, conlnlenced a direct correspondence, which bas 
been renewed from time to time, and has conveyed to the Amir assurances 
of tlie neighbourly sentiments entertained by the Russian authorities 
towards the Afghan Government." 
On being informed by Sher Ali of the first communication 
from General Kaufmann, Lord Mayo, on June 24th, 1870, wrote 
back to the Amir":- 
( L  These letters will doubtless be, when rightly understood, a, source of 
satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to your Highness.'' 
It does not appear from these extracts that the morbid dread 
of Russian machinations, which has led Lord Salisbury and Lord 
Lytton to depart from the wise policy of their predecessors, had 
at that time any influence on the minds of those intrusted mith 
the Gorernment of India. 
Lord Mayo lost his valuable life, by the hand of a foul 
assassin, on the 8th of February, 1872. Lord Northbroolr 
succeeded him on the 3rd of May, 1872. The most important 
incident connected with Afghanistan during the period of his 
Viceroyalty was the dispatch to Simla, in 1873, by Sher Ali of 
a Special Envoy, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah. 
Alarmed at the fall of Khiva, the Amfr sought more intimate 
relations with the British Government, and desired to ascertain 
how far he could rely on British aid in the event of his territories 
being threatened by Russia. His demands hornever, in the first 
instance, were so extravagant that it was impossible for Lord 
Northbrook to comply with them, more especially as Sher AX was 
unwilling that Afghanistan should be called upon to make any 
return for the assistance rendered by the British Government. 
I n  fact, the Amir, professing to  believe that our interests were as 
B 
much concerned or more so than his own, sought an  conditional 
guarantee of protection and very large payments of money for 
the fortscation of his fiontier and the equipment of his army. 
Lord Northbrook very properly objected to these requests, 
which would have entailed unlimited responsidility and expen- 
ditme, without our being able to exercise any control over the 
course the Amir might choose to pursue. But Lord Northbrook 
mas quite willing to give a guarantee with reasonable conditions 
attached to it, and ultimately he assured the Envoy that the 
British Government, in the event of any actual or threatened 
aggression, would assist the Amir "with arms and money, and 
also, in case of necessity, with troops." A letter to this effect 
was addressed by Lord Northbrook to the Amir, to which the 
"Record of Conversations " with the Envoy was appended. 
This record was a formal document officially communicated to 
the Envoy, and signed by him, and in Lord Northbrook's opinion 
was binding on the British Government. The Envoy doubting 
how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to 
any definite arrangement, it was considered desirable to postpone 
the h a 1  settlement to a more favourable opportunity, when so 
important R matter might be discussed with the Am'r in person. 
That the A d r  accepted this promise of assistance as a binding 
engagement on the part of Lord Northbrook, in the same manner 
as he accepted the letters and assurances of friendship and 
support fiom Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, is abundantly 
evident from the constant reference made to these assurances by 
Syed Noor Mahorned, at his conference with Sir Lewis Pelly.* 
The Envoy says :-" It is far from the melfare of States if there 
should be the possibility of objection to the promises made by 
such religious Governments, and such Ministers and Viceroys." 
Again :-'' Therefore, I earnestly hope, for the welfare of the two 
Governments, that his Excellency the Viceroy, through your good 
offices, d with great frankness and sincerity of purpose act in 
conformity with the course of past Viceroys." And again, with 
mournful earnestness, he says :-"Pour Government is a powerful 
and a great one, ours is a small and weak one. We have long 
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been on terms of friendship, and the Amir now clings to the skirt 
of the British Government, and, till his hand be cut off, he mill 
not relaz his hold of it." But Lord Lytton, with the giant 
strength of British power at his back) is determined to press his 
obnoxious conditions, and is deaf to all other considerations. 
He does not even shrink from dealing with the acts and promises 
of his predecessors in a manner hitherto unknown in India, thus 
inflicting a serious blow an the confidence of every Native Prince 
in the assarances of Her Majesty's Representatives. 
Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook had all 
given solemn promises in writing to the Amir ; but, according to 
Lord Lytton, these were c40nly verbal understandings," as if 
formal official letters and written engagements were of no account 
unless embodied in definite treaties. ' Sir Lewis Pelly tells the 
Envoy :-ccYour Excellency, however, appears to be under an im- 
pression that obligations and liabilities of this kind, though not 
contracted under treaty, have been none the less incurred by the 
British Government, through certain written and verbal assu- 
rances received by the Amir in 1869 &om Lord Mayo, and by 
Etis Highness's Envoy from Lord Northbrook ; this impression 
is entirely erroneous." It is of importance here to note that, in 
Lord Salisbury's Despatch of the 28 th February, 1876, this verbal 
understanding of 1869 is spoken of as a "solemn and deliberate 
declaration approved by Her Majesty's advisers ;" and it is admit- 
ted that, " to the Amir who had ;received that declaration under 
circumstances of some solemnity and parade' it appears to have 
conveyed a pledge of definite action in his favour." I n  reference, 
also, to the declaration of Lord Northbrook, in 1873, Lord Salis- 
bury writes :-'< The terms of the declaration, however, although 
sufficient to justify rel3roaches on the part of Sher Ali, if, in the 
contingency to which it referred, he should be left unsupported 
by the British Government, mere unfortunately too ambiguous to 
secure confidence or inspire gatitude on the part of His Highness." 
Lord Salisbury is pleased to characterize Lord Northbrook's decla- 
ration as c L  ambiguous," but the ami r  himself did not so accept 
it, as His Highness's Envoy repeatedly af6rmed. I t  was left to 
Lord Lytton, and to Sir Lewis Pelly under Lord Lytton's instruc- 
tions, to repudiate the written engagements of previous Viceroys. 
fiir John Malcolm's maxim, inculcated upon political officers in 
the olden time, mas more generous and more worthy of the British 
Government :-" When any article of an engagement is doubtful, 
I think it should be invariably explained with more leaning to 
the expectations originally raised in the weaker than to the inte- 
rests of the stronger Power." It is dif3cult to conceive anything 
more calculated to sow doubt and distrust in the minds of the 
Envoy and of the Amir than this conduct of Lord Lytton. Lord 
Northbrook has stated that "he endeavoured, to the best of his 
ability, to carry out the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, 
not only because he thought it right to carry on a successive 
policy, but because he entirely believed and concurred in that 
policy, and &he reasons on vhich that policy was founded." In  
the conference with Sir Lewis Pelly, the Cabul Envoy aiFrmed 
that, from the time Lord Northbrook came to India to the time 
he left, although there mere discussions on the subject, still he 
left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct 
of his predecessors, and with preceding usage. 
Sir Henry Norman also writes :- 
L'My opinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Northbrook's 
departure the Amir had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was 
somewhat out of temper and was disquieted by writings which more or 
less pointed a t  measures distasteful to him. Any real resentment he may 
have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to 
measures taken from April 1876 to the present time." 
Lord Lytton succeeded to the Viceroyalty on the 12th of 
April, l87G, and agitating rumours began immediately to be cir- 
culated at home and abroad as to important changes about to be 
adopted in the policy that had hitherto been pursued on the 
North-West frontier, and in the management of our relations 
with the Amir of Cabul. Lord Lytton took to India Lord Salis- 
bury's despatch of the 28th February, 1876, which prescribed a 
line of policy entirely oppoeed to that which had been carried out 
by previoua Biceroys under instructions fiom successive Adminis- 
trations at home. That policy had been pressed upon Lord North- 
brook's Government, but weighty reasons had been given in 
opposition to it, showing the e d s  to which it would inevitably 
lead. Lord Salisbury himself, it would appear, had his mis- 
gi~ings, as he writes that, ill case of "the irretrievable alienation 
of the Amir, no time must be lost in re-considering, from a 
new point of view, the policy to be pursued in reference to 
Afghanistan." 
*/ '  Lord Lytton, it is understood, kept this important deupatcb 
t o  himself for a considerable period without communicating its 
contents to his Council. I t  will be observed that it is addressed 
 imply to the Governor-General of India, and not to the Governor- 
I General in Council. According t o  law, the Government of India ! is vested in the Governor-General in Council, and it is not legal, 
nor has it hitherto been the practice, that the Governor-General 
should be recognized apart from his Council. This is, probably, 
one of the innovations alluded to by Sir Arthur Hobhouse, when 
he draws attention to Lord Salisbury's new mode of governing 
India. It may be further remarked, in reference to this despatch 
of the 28th February, 1876, which Lord Lytton carried to India, 
that, as far as can be discovered from the published correspondence, 
no reply to it was sent home until the 10th May, 1877. 
During this long interval, when successive steps were being 
taken to inaugurate a complete change of policy, and when Par- 
liament and the country were designedly kept in ignorance of the 
course of action pursued, the Government of India must have been 
carried on, as regards its foreign relations, in demi-official letters 
exclianged between Lord Salisburg and the Viceroy.  his system 
of personal government may be in perfect accordance with the 
peculiar idiosyncrasies of Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton; but 
the evils that are likely to flow from the exercise of unchecked 
authority by Viceroys and Ministers, and from the absence of due 
record and publicity, in such an important dependency as India, 
are patent to all who have stuhed the history of their country. 
John Mill writes :- 
" The government of dependencies by a Minister and his subordi- 
nates, under the sole control of Parliament, is not a new experiment in 
Englantl. That form of Cololliitl Government lost the United States, and 
llnd nearly lost all the Colonies of any considerable population and 
importnnce." 
," -..---I - 
Our proceedings on the frontier began at this time to excite 
interest in Europe, and various articles in the Continental Press 
drew attention to our dealings with the Khan of Khelat, and the 
apparently wider range of our general frontier policy. The fol- 
lowing extract from Le T e m ~ ~ s  shovs that, in these days of rapid 
communication and spread of intelligence through '' our own cor- 
respondents," everything that takes place in India is made 
subject uf comment, and its bearing upon European politics 
weighed and discussed. La ~ i n y s  writes :- 
'' NOS lecteurs auront sans doute remarque dans les depgches d'l~ier 
une nouvelle quc la dernibre lettre cle notre correspondant de 1'Inde faisait 
prdvoir. Le gourernement Anglo-Indien vient de signer avec le Khan 
de Kelate un traitd qui recule les frontikres n~ilitaires de 1'Inde-dnglaise 
vers le- Mord Ouest, ou en d'autres terrnes les rapproche de celles du 
Tur-Irestnu russe. La politique Indo-Anglaise rompt par cet acte 
avec cies principes cju'elle professait depuis un assez grand nombre 
d't~11116e~. Elle s'dtuit prhoccupbe B plusieurs reprises dans ces derniers 
teinps de divers projets da geu1.e de celui qui vient d'Btre adopt& et mis 
S exdcution, mais une idhe prbvalrtit dans ses conseils, C'Btait que la 
domination Britannique ne devait pas 2tre poussee au delh des limites 
atteintes. La, politique opposCe qui prend aujourd'hui le dessus, politiquo 
d'initiative, l' spirited policy " dieent les Anglais, n'aurait ni but, ni raison 
dJ8tre, s'il ne fallait y voir 1s temoignnge d'une mbfiance en Bveil et le 
programme 1u6rne de pricautions que l'bngleterre juge indispensables 
pour d6jouer tl'avance les plans supposes de la Russie, sa voisine dans 
1'Asie Centrale. L'envoi d'un Resident -4nglais i, Caboul pour sur- 
veiller 1'Emir itccusi! d'intriguer avec les Russes parait ddcid6. Ces 
mesures qui sont iiiterpretdes Q Xoscow et B Saint Petersburg dans un 
sens d6favorable n'ont pas l'approbation de tout le monde en bngleterre. 
On fait valoir notanlment contre l'occupation armde de nouveaux 
territoires, outre les considdrations d'icono~nie des raisons politiques et 
militaires dent la nloins specieuse n'est pas que le meilleur moyen de 
rendre service de son ennemi, c'est d'aller :i son rencontre, parceque cela 
lui Qpargne In  moitid dn cbemin." 
Had Lord Northbrook remained at the head of affairs in 
India, his measures would have been understood to have been 
directed solely to  the settlement of the Khelat disputes, to the 
protection of the commercial traffic through the Bolan Pass, and 
to the pacification of the Belooch tribes in that vicinity. They 
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hcnsion on 
the part of the Amir of Cabul nor mould they have afforded any 
grounds for the belief, that we mere taking the first step to throw 
domn the gauntlet to Russia, and were preparing for a further 
advance, with a view to the rectification of our North-Western 
/ 
frontier. But Lord Lytton made no secret of his ultimate in- 
tentions, nor of the Imperial scope of the ~olicv which he had 
J. Y 
come out to India to inaugurate. afgllanistan must be brought 
within British influence ; to this end British officers must be 
stationed in Afghan cities, and to use his own words, "having 
regard to probable contingencies in Central Asia," fiolltier afFairs 
must henceforth be regulated with a view to  more important 
objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British 
border ." j' 
J' Here we have a distinct change of policy enunciated, and the 
object declared without reserve, that object being the rectifying 
- - - 
of the British frontier, to counteract the advance of fiussia in 
Central Asia. This departure from a line of policy d i c h  the 
British Government had pursued for so many years was con- 
trary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of our understanding with 
the Russian Government, and as the writer in Le Temps says, 
fbould have no possible aim or reason except as a countermove 
and measure of precaution against the supposed designs of Rus- 
sia. ' The Russian Government had several times assured England 
that "Afghanistan was outside the sphere of Russian action." We 
learn from Sir John Strachey's minute, and Lord Northbrook has 
confirmed the statement, that Russia had shorn on many occa- 
sions that it had "no desire to  depart &om its engagements in 
that matter." Of course this compact could exist only on the 
supposition that England and Russia continued on terms of amity, 
and that England herself preserved her neutral attitude. 
I When the discussions in Europe assumed a threatening aspect, 
and native troops were brought from India, and when all sorts of 
rumours were afloat in reference to the hostile intentions of Eng- 
land, Russia naturally felt absolved from her tacit understanding 
We must look st these matters from a Russian as well as horn 
an English point of view. Russia is as jealous and suspicious of 
us as we are of her, and is as much entitled to take precautions 
with regard to her possessions in Central Asia as we are with 
regard to India. The warlike preparations of Lord Lytton on 
the banks of the Indus, which alarmed the Amir of Cabul, were 
currently reported to be preparatory to a movement, through 
Afghanistan, upon the dominions of Russia in the countries 
beyond the Oxua. What  did General Skobeleff say to Oolonel 
Brackenbury ?- 
'' I cannot make out what has become of that column of ten thou- 
sand men, organized by your people to  raise Central Asia against us.." 
As in Russia, so in England there is a class of people, gifted 
with facile pens and fertile imaginations, who are constantly 
employed in sounding the alarm, and prognosticating evil results 
from the advance and progress of what they are pleased to term 
rival nations. France, America, Russia, at different intervals, have 
come under this category. These men, while loud in their profea- 
sions of patriotism,'by fostering a spirit of antagonism, and pander- 
ing to national prejudices, are the worst enemies of their country, 
the real substantial interests of which depend mainly on the  
continuance of peace, and on the cultivation of friendly relations 
with all the world. Every thoughtful Englishman must lament 
the bitter state of feeling against Russia which pervades England 
at the present moment, and all who estimate aright the dreadful 
calamities a conflict would entail on both countries must desire to 
remove any causes of misunderstanding which would tend to 
precipitate such a catastrophe. There may not be any danger of 
immediate collision, but the worst feature of our present policy in  
Europe and in Asia is that it  enlarges the area of prospective 
aaQtzgonism, and is pregnant with future mischief. 
The real questions are, were the proceedings of Russia in 
Central Asia, including the dispatch of General Stolietoff's 
Mission to  Cabul, ~ u c h  as to give England just cause of serious 
complaint ? Have the explanations afforded by Russia been of 
a character to satisfy tho British Government ? / w e  have the  
statement of the Prime Minister that, looking to the strained 
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relations that existed between England and Russia at a certain not 
very distant period, the expedition which Russia mas preparing 
in Central Asia at that time, with which the Rfissicm to Cabul was 
connected, was perfectly allowable. Lord Salisbury also is quite 
contented to accept the explanations of M. de Giers, and takes 
for panted that " all the former assurances of the Russian Govern- 
ment in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity." 
Russia is therefore entirely absolved, and Lord Beaconsfield 
declares her conduct to have been "very satisfactory ;" but 
he adds :- 
L '  After all that had occurred it was totally impossible for ua to leave 
things as they were; you colxld not go on after you liad found Russian 
armies almost in sight of Cabul, and an Embassy within its walls ; yon 
could not go on on the 011 system. It was absolutely necessmy t o  con- 
sider what course should be talcen." /" 
It is to employ somewhat figurative language, to speak (( of 
Russian armies almost in sight of Cabul," but it mas necessary to 
make out a case of British interests in jeopardy. I t  mas politic 
to accept the explanations of Russia, but a danger had been 
disclosed against which it  was imperative t o  provide. Whether 
that danger was real or unreal, or whether, if real, it was best 
met by the course adopted, are the points at issue. I n  pursuanoe, 
however, of his object, the obli~ations of justice, of reciprocal 
treaties, and of the rights of an independent nation to preserve its 
freedom, which it had enjoyed for hundreds of years, were 
apparently of small moment to Lord Beaconsfield. In  a similar 
spirit Prince Bismarck, on the occasion of the annexation of 
Hanover, declared "that to attend to like considerations mould 
be to substitute the superficial for the essential, and that his 
objects must be carried through by blood and iron. Upon those 
who venture to remmstrate against such imperial doctrines, Lord 
Beaconsfield strives to nffix the stigma " of peace at any price 
advocacy," and backed by his present large majorities in both 
Houses of Parliament, he is enabled to snatch a temporary 
triumph ; but it remains to be seen whether, when the whole case 
is before the country, this verdict will be confirmed. 
* 
Mr. Burt, the honest and able representative of tho working 
classes in the House of Commons, stated :- 
'' He hacl many ~pportunit~ies of ascertaining the feelirlgs of the 
working classes, and he did not know a single man who believed that we 
were right in this war. He had not met with any wol-king mall who did 
not believe that we were engaged in an unjust and cewardly tvar." 
The instincts of the working men of England, in favour of 
justice and fair play, are as strong cmd as true as of many of those 
who, by the accidents of outward position, exorcise a more 
authoritative voice in determining the policy of the country. Lord 
Canning, when he set his face like a flint against the ravenous 
cry for blood, and earned, to his immortal honour, what was then 
considered by the unthinldng many, the opprobrious epithet of 
" Clemency Canning," lived to witness the revulsion in his favour ; 
and .the illustrious names of Gladstone and of Lawrence, in com- 
mon with hundreds of England's most distinguished citizens, can 
afford to  fling back with scorn the " peace at any price " stigma 
sought to be cast upon them by Lord Beaconsfield. It may be 
stated, once for an, that those who are the foremost in condemning 
the injustice and impolicy of the present Afghan war, would be 
the first, in the event of unprovoked aggression by Russia, or by 
any other Power, to advocate the putting forth the wholo strcngth 
and resources of England to avert any real danger from our Indian 
Empire. 
The conduct of Russia having been so very satisfactory," 
according to Lord Beaconsfield, where was the necessity of driving 
Sher Ali into a corner, so that he could not but stand at bay, or lose 
his influence with the ignorant and fanatical tribes over whom he 
exercised a precarious sway ? Was the danger to India so pressing 
and imminent that we were obliged to act "with breathless haste?" 
to use Sher Ali's expression. We learn from Lord Northbrook 
that when he left India, "though Sher Ali would havo dislilred any 
interference on the part of England, he would have disliked any 
shown on the part of Russia to a far greater extent." Sir IIcnrg 
Norman confirms this statement. What induced Sher Ali's change 
of feeling 2 It was owing to the various measures adopted by Lord 
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Lytton, which, step by step, were inevitably leading up to the 
present calamitous war. This mas foreseen by the most expe- 
rienced members of Lord Lytton's Council, mhile those best 
conversant with .Indian affairs at home watched the progress of 
events with undisguised alarm. Under this aspect the subject 
mas brought before both Houses of Parliament, in order to elicit 
explanations from the Ministers who are primarily responsible for 
our Indian policy. Before the attempt is made to t~ace  the suc- 
cessive measures adopied by Lord Lytton, which have culminated 
in the present disastrous results, it will be important to point out 
the nature of the Ministerial explanations which have proved so 
much a t  variance with the real facts of the case. I t  will be 
advisable also to state clearly the distinctive features of the past 
and present policy in reference to  the North- Western frontier of 
India. 
On the 9th of August, 1877, in answer to Mr. Grant DufF, 
Sir Stafford Northcote spoke thus :- 
(( My honourable friend, the member for the EIgin Burghs, mitb the 
knowledge ho has, and the clearness with which he always speaks on 
these subjects, speaks of two schools in respect to this frontier queation, 
the one which is called the forward policy, and the opposite school which 
i s  rather for looking back, and not committing ourselves to  advancing 
beyond our frontiers. Well, I have, as  my honourable friend reminded us, 
a1,lways leant to  the policy of the second of those schools. I have always 
demurred to the idea, whicli has been put forward by some, that the best 
.way to  meet danger is to advance beyond our o m  frontier ; and I have 
always maintained that  the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselvesl 
are those t o  strengthen ourselves within our own frontiers, and to do so 
by a combination of measures moral hnd material." 
Then, after giving a rapid sketch of the measures that com- 
mended themselves to his judgment, Sir St~fford added :- 
" In all these views, which I have been alvays led to hold, as to the 
best mode of protecting India from direct attack, I believe there is no 
change whatever in the  policy of Her Majesty's Government." 
Lord Salisbury spoke to the same effect, in answer to the 
Duke of Argyll, in the House of Lords. Sir Stafford Northcote, 
having himself filled the office of Secretary of State for India, 
must have been well aware that, for years past, there have been 
two antagonistic schools of opinion, with reference to the policy to 
be pursued on our North-Western frontier. H e  must have had 
before him the recorded views of all the eminent servants of the  
Government on both sides of this much vexed question. He must 
have studied and weighed these views, and having come t o  
deliberate conclusions, he must have brought them before the 
Cabinet of which he was a member, and then, as the organ of 
that Cabinet in regard to the affairs of India, he must have 
embodied the decision of himself and his colleagues in the various 
despatches transmitted t o  the Viceroy. Sir Stafford Northcote, 
therefore, speaks with authority upon a question with which he is 
familiar, on which he has had the best opportunity of forming a 
correct judgment, and in the right decision of which the most 
important results to India and to England are involved. There 
is no doubt also that the views he expresses have been held and 
acted upon by successive Administrations, through a long series of 
years, and have been recommended and enforced by all the  
eminent Viceroys from Lord Dalhousie to  Lord Northbrook. 
What then is the policy which has received the sanction of so 
many distinguished Statesmen, both at home and in India, which 
has been acquiesced in with satisfaction by the British nation 
generally, and from which Lord Lytton has been the f i s t  to 
depart, in obedience to instructions from the Ministry who 
appointed him to the Viceroyalty? It is not, as one of its 
opponents states, in an elaborate article, written in defence of 
Lord Lytton, iniBlackwood's Magazine, of August 1877, j C  absolute 
inaction within, and indifference without, the border." It is not, 
as a distinguished officer, Sir Henry Havelock, wrote in a letter 
to the Daily News, "to do nothing, sit still, fold your arms, let 
matters glide, and let us hope that it will all come right in the  
end." I t  is not a timid, hesitating, half-hearted policy, blind to 
the march of events, ignoring possible dangers, wrapped in a 
fool's paradise, without prevision of the future, or apprehension 
of any change of circumstances which might necessitate rnodifi- 
cations, or even an entirely new course of action. I ts  main 
features are delineated in the f o ~ o w i n g ~ p r e g n ~ n ~ ~ ~ . ~ a ~ ] : ~ ~ h ~  of 
)Lord Ellenborough's proclamation of lat October, 1842)- 
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c(  Content with the limits nature appears to have a~lsigned to its Xm- 
pire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts t o  the establish- 
ment and maintenance of general peace; to the protection of the 
Sovereigns and Chiefs, its allies ; and to the prosperity and happiness of 
its own faithful fiubjects. The rivers of the Puujab and Indns, and the 
mountainous passes and barbarous tribes of Afghmistnn, will be placed 
between the British army and an enemy approaching from the west, if, 
indeed, such enemy there can be, and no longer between the army and 
its supplies. The enormous expenditure required for the support of n 
large force in a false military position, a t  a distance from its own 
frontier, and its resources, will no longer arrest every measure for the 
improvenient of the country and of the people. The combined army of 
England and of India, superior in equipment, in discipline, in valour, and 
in the officers by whom i t  is commanded, t o  any force which call be 
opposed to it  in Asia, will stand in unassailable strength upon its own 
soil, and for ever, under the blessing of Providence, preserve tho  glorious 
Empire i t  has won in security and honour." . 
These paragraphs sketch in broad outline the frontier policy 
adopted at that date, and persevered in until Lord Lytton's 
accession to the Viceroyalty. No doubt, in the thirty-six years 
that have elapsed since that period, vast changes have taken 
place. England and Russia have advanced to meet each othcr 
across the continent of Asia with giant strides. As Sir Robert 
Peel stated in the debate of June 23rd, 1842, " between civilized 
nations and nations very much their inferior there is a great 
tendency in the former to ex te~d  their empire in order to give 
security to what they possess." ,' England on her part has added 
to her dominions the country of the Amirs of Sinde, a conquest 
designated by Sir Henry Pottinger as  " the most unprincipled 
and disgraceful that ever stained the annals of our Empire in 
India." Sir James Outram also spoke of it " as most tyrannical, 
positive robbery." , Colonel Meadows Taylor writes:--" I do not 
believe that Lord Ellenborough ever desired the conquest or 
annexation of Sinde ; but he was in the hands of a man who, led 
on by personal ununscrupulous ambition and daring, formed, as it 
appears to me, from the beginning, the resolution of displacing 
the Amirs, and regarding its strategic importance of converting 
Sinde into a British province." In the Contemporary Review of 
November 1876, Mr. Gladstone states :-" The organization of the 
Empire (Russian), efficient for many purposes, does not appear 
to secure effective control from the head over the more distz~nt 
members. At different periods our own Central Government 
has had occasio~ to feel the insufficiency of its restraining force. 
A notsble example occurred in 1843, when Sinde was conquered 
by Napier, under the auspices of Lord Ellenborough. That 
conquest was disapproved, I believe, unanimously by the Cabinet 
of Sir Robert Peel, of which I can speak, as I had just entered 
it at that time. But the Ministry were powerless, inasmuch as 
the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning 
it, and it remains an accomplished fact." This weakness of t h e  
extremities is, as Burke writes, "the eternal law of extension 
and detached empire." It is scarcely needful t o  point the moral 
of this incident to the case of Ehiva. Russia has her Kauf- 
manns, as we have our Napiers. 
In  1848 we conquered the Punjab, the land of the five 
rivers, with its area of 95,768 square miles, and its population 
of 17,500,000 souls. I n  1856 the fertile and flourishing king- 
dom of Oude was brought under British sway. I n  striking 
contrast to  these rich acquisitions of territory it is curious t'o 
read Mr. Schuyler's account of the Russian possessions i n  
Central Asia. He writes :- 
L' Central Asia has no stores of wealtl~, and no economical resoclrces; 
neither by its agricultural, nor by its mineral wealth, nor by i ts  com- 
merce, nor by the revenue to be derived from it, can i t  ever repay the 
Rusfiians for what it has already cost, and for the rapidly-increasing ex- 
penditure bestowed upon it." Again-" Of the whole of Russian Central  
Asia (excluding the late annexed Z<yzillcum desert), only per cent .  
is cultivable, which spcaks plainly as to the value of the recently- 
acquired possessions." Again-" Owing to the actual insufficiency of 
the local production, most of the grain for army use has to be brought 
from Vierny, Kopal, and Southern Siberia." 
A well-informed writer, in the Qz~arterly Revieza, of January 
1879, states :- 
'' Russian Turkestan, notwitl~standing ita great extent, is not in any 
point of view, in productiveness, in trade, in populntion, or in military 
power, t o  be compared with one single province of' the Punjab." 
In addition to the Punjab and Oude, year after year witnessed 
the annexations of Sattarah, Jhansi, Nagpore, Pegu, and other 
small Native 8tates. Lord Dalhousie thus announced his policy :- 
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" It is my strong and deliberate opinion that, in the exerciae of a 
wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to 
neglect or put aside such rightful opportunities of acquiring 
territory or revenue as may, from time to time, present them- 
selves." Although there is no case so flagrant as that of the 
unfortunate Amirs of Sinde, yet, meighed in the scales of 
justice, some of the annexations under the rule of Lord Dalhousie 
will scarcely be deemed by impartial judges to merit the designa- 
tion of (' rightful." It behoves an Englishman, therefore, "to cast 
out the beam out of his own eye, and then he d l  see more 
clearly to cast out the mote out of his brother's eye." While 
England was gradually absorbing native kingdoms and princi- 
palities in the Indian peninsula, and pushing forvard her 
territories to the great mountain border line beyond the Indus, 
Russia was overrunning large tracts of country in Central Asia, 
and subduing Mohammedan States, where tyranny and misrule 
prevailed to an extent, equalled perhaps, but never surpassed, in 
the history of the world. 
What British heart does not throb with indignation at the 
recollection of the sufferings of Stoddart and Conolly in the 
dungeons of the fiendish Nasiroollah Khan, Amir of Bokhara, 
who reigned from 1826 to 18(30? The common saying 
was, "In Bokhara nobody knows what is to be done, to-day 
you are alive, to-morrow they behead you." One of 
Nasiroollah's last acts was to order the execution' of his 
wife. "The executioner tied her hands, and shot her with O, 
pistol in the back ~f her head." He did not kill her at once ; she 
fell, and struggled for some time. The executioner bickeJ her 
twelve times on her breast and back till she died." Vambery 
states lC  that she was executed close to the dying M r ,  and 
the abominable tyrant breathed his last with his g l a ~ n g  eye 
fixed upon the gushing blood of the sister of his detested enemy." 
What a picture Mr. Schuyler gives of another Ruler, Ehadayar 
Khan, of Khokand :-" Under him, neither virtue nor life mas 
safe." "By the wholesale butchery of 20,000 Kiptchah he 
excited the hatred of his subjects." 
* Schuyler, Vol. I. p. 97. 
As a contrast to these Rulers, Sir Bartle Frere writes thus of 
the Rajah of Sattarah :-" The late Rajah having been a liberal 
and humane, a just and popular, Ruler, any supposed want of 
equity in the appropriation of his dominions will lack the  
popula~ity which a similar measure, whatever its grounds, 
would always find amongst the industrious and peaceful inhabit- 
ants of a State delivered from anarchy and oppression." I n  
spite of the remonstrances of Sir Bartle Frere, and of other 
eminent men, Sattarah, a model of good native administration, 
fell a victim to the dominant passion of annexation, which 
then prevailed in Indian councils. 
Not to enlarge more on this branch of the subject, sufficient 
to say that, exempleng the truth of 8i.r Robert Peel's statement 
thirty-six years ago, instead of the two Empires of England 
and Russia being divided by half the continent of Asia, 
there is now intervening between their political frontiers a 
mere narrow strip of teriitory a few hundred miles across. 
By the force of circumstances, as some would say, bu t  ra ther  
under the control of a Higher Power, who mysteriously works 
out His own purposes known from the beginning, through t h e  I 
instrumentality of war, and who regulates all things to subserve I 
one great end, step by step two mighty Christian nations seem to  1 
be closing in upon the Nohammedan kingdoms of the world, and  I 
bringing them under Christian domination. 
There is no foundation for the oft-reiterated assertion tha t  t h e  
various Indian Governments which preceded Lord Lytton were 
blind to the results that might %ow from the gradual advance of 
the  Russians in Central Asia. I n  his despatches of t h e  3 rd  of 
September, 1867, and of the 4th of January, 1869, L a r d  
Lawrence draws the attention of the Home Government to this  
question, and suggests the course to be pursued. B u t  t h e  
proceedings of Russia were not viewed through an exagge- 
rated medium; they were not regarded with a petty s e E s h  
reference to British interests alone, but under the broader aspect 
of the benefits that would accrue to mankind generally by t h e  
substitution of a great Christian and improving Government in 
lieu o f  the oppression and barbarity of Mohammedan tyrants. 
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I n  the same spirit, Sir Herbert Edwardes wrote twenty years ago, 
'' Can anyone say that to substitute Russian rule for the anarchy 
and manstealing of Khiva, the dark tyranny of Bolrhara, ancl the 
nomad barbarism of Khokand would be anything but a gain to 
mankind 2 " 
England has preceded Russia in her mission of introducing 
civilization and Christianity into Asia, and, in spite of many 
drawbaclrs and shortconlings, her rule has been a beneficent one, 
and she has given order, and security for life and property, and 
respect for law, where formerly anarchy and misrule for the most 
part prevailed. Our conquests have been generally the result of 
unforeseen circumstances, and frequently carried out against the 
express orders of the Home authorities. There was no settled 
policy of territorial aggrandizement. In the pursuit of commercial 
advantages the East India Company from an insignificant factory 
built up a magnificent Empire, and bequeathed it as a legacy to 
the Crown. Wherein lies the great difference between the conduct 
of Russia and that of our own country ? ' Even admitting that 
the impelling force is stronger in Russia, including as it does the 
religious element, and that the restraining force is less powerful 
and persistent, from the absence of free discussion, and indepen- 
dence of thought and action, still, without having recourse t o  the 
apocryphal Will of Peter the Great, every thoughtful reader of his- 
tory will recognize the same causes which underlie the advance both 
of England and Russia, and in like manner forbid retrogression. 
Is it then for England with her Colonies and possessions, 
and vantage strongholds snatched from other nations in all quarters 
of the globe, to arrogate the right to say to another great nation, 
" Thus far thou shalt go, m d  no further" ? Would England her- 
self submit to such dictation ? Why should England look at these 
questions only in the light of a jcalous rival of Russia, watching 
each movement with jaundiced eye, putting the most unfavour- 
able construction on every act, and thus creating a state of angry 
feeling which must inevitably, sooner or later, lead to collision, 
and thereby entail immeasurable evil on both countries? 
In a despatch of Lord Mayo, dated June 3rd) 1870, he 
C 
recognizes the fact of England and Russia having "a corn- 
mon mission in Asia, namely, the establishment of good 
government and the civilization of the mighty nations com- 
mitted to their care," and recommends a course of action which 
Sir Henry Ramlinson pronounces to be "thoroughly unselfish," 
but "hardy  practical." Would to heaven that British policy 
with regard to this question could at all times have merited the 
epithet of "thoroughly unseKsh." There is little doubt that 
eminently practical results mould have followed. But then the 
unselfishness must have been real, without spot or blemish, patent 
to the world. There must have been no secret conventions, no 
sharp practice, no attempt to over-reach other nations. Lord 
Carnarvon told us recently that the old jealousies and sources of 
irritation between England and America had died away; and 
how has this been brought about ? "By the right intention of 
each Government, and by the exercise of tact, judgment, good 
feeling and sense, on the part of their representatives." 
Alas ! such is not the position of England and Russia. To 
the hindrance of progress, to the misfortune of mankind, to the 
opprobrium of our common Christianity, these two mighty nations, 
with no conflicting interests, no conceivable reason why they should 
interfere with each other, have drifted into an antagonistic, attitude 
fraught with the direst evils to themselves and to the world. 
Let it be admitted that there are classes in all countries 
which, from ignorance, inertness, or interested motives, are blind 
to the tremendous consequences and calamities of war. Still, the 
government of the world is not carried on by these classes. 
Rulers and Statesmen, it may be charitably supposed, a,re actuated 
by higher impulses, and have a deeper sense of their responsi- 
bilities. Attila, Tamerlane, Nadir Shah, and Napoleon have 
~assed away, and have left the brand of infamy attached 
to their names in the world's annals. Can it be believed 
that Russian Rulers and Russian Statesmen, in defiance of 
all lams human and dirine, are bent on a settled and 
deliberate course of territorial aggrandizement ? Is it credible 
that the Czar, with whom the chief power rests in such 
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matters, like the Oriental Despot held up to execration in the 
burning words of Burke, "resolves, in the gloomy recesses of 
a mind capable of such things, to compound all the materials of 
fury, havock, and desolation into one black cloud, to  pour down 
t h e  whole of its contents" on the peaceful and fertile plains of 
India  ? 
Russia has ample work before her for a long time to come, 
t o  apply a healing salve to the bleeding pores of her wide-spread 
territory, to allay internal disorder, t o  restore her impoverished 
finances, and to consolidate her conquests in Central Asia. But, of 
course, if England adopt towards her an irritating policy in 
Europe and in Asia ; if so many English pens, dipped in gall, 
constantly hold her up to scorn and indignation, and sow hatred 
broadcast between the two nations, but one result can follow. 
Years ago, Montalembert wrote : -" L'insupportable arrogance 
de  la diplomatie Anglaise envers les faibles, et de la presse Anglaise 
envers tout le monde, a soulev6 la juste indignation d'une foule 
d'honn8tes gens." There are noble exceptions in the English 
press, but their voice is drowned in the general chorus of exciting 
language and indiscriminating abuse. 
.,s' Granting, however, the fact, that Russia means mischief, 
what course ought England to purfiueTf We should not, I 
presume, idly %nd sstopidly gazing on the menacing meteor," 
fold our arms, sit still, and let matters glide. W e  should 
prepare to meet the danger. We should, in fact, have 
been in a state of preparation long before the crisis. There 
is not the smallest probability of Russia being able t o  steal a 
march upon us, so as to take us unawares./ The measures of 
defence to be adopted would depend on the nature of the attack ; 
the whole strength of the British Empire would be put forth to 
maintain the security of our Indian dominions. There is no 
difference of opinion on this vital point between the advocates of 
a forward policy and the supporters of the opposite school. The 
only question is as to the means by which this end is to be 
sought. ' 
Until lately the Governmenis at home and in India have held 
the opinion of Sir Robert Peel, when he stated :-" Whatever may 
be the conduct of Russia, I believe that the Governments of 
England and of India are sufficiently powerful to protect them- 
selves. I do not think that we are, as a nation, dependent on the 
co-operation or good faith of Russia or of any other Power." These 
fern words contain the germ of a great truth, which it would be 
well if England's Ministers of the present day, and England's 
citizens, would take to heart. W e  need no entangling alliances 
with unknown future responsibilities as a bulwark to India or to 
any other portion of British territory. England relies upon her- 
self; in quietness and confidence is her strength. She seeks not 
to give offence, and is not easily provoked; but, while apparently 
passive, she silently concentrates her power, and is not the less 
ready in a just cause, if, unhappily, such cause should arise, to 
defend her rights, and to preserve ~~ilsullied the rich inheritance 
of fame and dominion transmitted t o  her from her forefathers. I n  
the case of undoubtedly aggressive measures on the part of Russia 
in regard to India, England would not; hesitate to accept the chal- 
lenge ; but the main brunt of the shock of confEct mould not be 
on the banks of the Indus, but in Europe ; and God forbid that 
the necessity should arise for such a gigautic trial of strength 
between the two nations. To avert this calamity, the greatest 
wisdom, prudence, and forbearance on the part of the States- 
men and representatives of Russia. and England are imperatively 
required ; and herein lies the essential distinction between the 
advocates of what Sir Stafford Northcote designates " the forward 
policy " and the policy pursued up to Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty 
by the 13ritish Government. 
I 
I t  is now. time to ask, What is this forward policy ? How 
did it originate ? by mhom has it been chiefly advocated ? Let 
us endeavour to trace its rise, progress, an6 development in 
the recorded opinions of its chief supporters. Foremost 
in the controversy we have two distinguished servants of 
the Indian ~ove-ent,iSir Henry Rawlingon and S k  Bartle 
Frere j Major-General Jacob, however, preceded them in the 
field, a born soldier, with true military instincts, but not 
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on that account best fitted to determine a great political question. 
suggestions towards the permanent defence of the North-West 
fkontier were submitted for the consideration of Government five 
and twenty years ago. "The Queen of England formaHy to 
assume the style and title of Empress of India" was one of his 
recommendations, and his policy may well be called an Imperid 
policy, requiring Imperial resources. He states that cc Englmd 
committed a n  egregious error in not driving every Russian back 
to the Caucasian range," a task more easily spoken of than 
accomplished. He was a strong advocate for the advance to 
Quettah; and having occupied that post, and located a large force 
there, he would under certain circumstances, have subsidized all 
Afghanistan with money and arms. In  a previous minute he 
had stated that "the afghans were utterly faithless and untrust- 
worthy, that he never even admitted one of their nation into the 
ranks of the force he commanded." Further, looking onward 
to  a great European war, he would garrison 'Eer&t with 
20,000 men, which would not necessarily, he stated, cause any 
increase to our Indian army, or at least to its cost." I t  may be 
here observed that it is'a favourite argument with the advocates 
of a forward policy, that our military expenses would not be 
increased, as the garrisons and troops stationed in Sinde and the 
Punjab might be diminished, and an improved &ontier Line 
obtained with little additional outlay. The same argument was 
put before the Russian Government. Mr. Schuyler tells us :-"It 
was said that the diminished expenses of Orenburg and Western 
Siberia would furnish sdc i en t  funds for the Government of 
Central Asia, but it was found that the expenses of Orenburg 
and Western Siberia had rather increased than diminished." 
After specifying other details, General Jacob concludes :-" Unless 
these and other subsidiary arrangements are speedily applied, 
and madully carried out, our Indian Empire will be lost within 
the next generation of men." I n  reference to General Jacob's 
recommendations, Sir .Herbert Edwardes, Bo say the least, an 
equally eminent authority, wrote at the time :-"So vast a pile of 
impracticable schemes seems more like some dream of conquest 
than a sober system of Imperial defence. The meaning of 
distances, the necessity of support, the physical dificulties of 
countries, the moral dttliculties of races, past  experience of 
them all, the future outlay involved, and present financial 
position of India, seem alike defied or ignored in such astounding 
speculations." 
! Sir Henry Rawlinson, a disciple of Sir John McNeill, 
is the most powerful and persistent advocate of the forward 
policy. His views are stated at length in his book, " England- - 
and Russia in the East," which he published as a sort of 
manual for students of the Eastern question. It is indeed a mine 
of inf'ormation on all questions connected with Central Asia and 
the North-West frontier of India. ~ u t h t  is written entirely from 
the atandpoint of a thorough, and doubtless sincere, conviction of 
Russian intrigue, perfidy, and settled purpose of territorial 
aggrandizement, undertaken with the ultimate object of hostile 
designs upon our Indian dominions.{ Sir Henry writes :-" I take 
some credit to myself that at so early a period as 1865 I forecasted 
the development of Russian power very much as it  has since 
occurred, and I then suggested the policy to which I now recur, 
of proceeding on the approach of real danger to man the outposts 
of our Indian Empire at HerAt and Candahar, in order to prevent 
their falling into the hands of the enemy." "Real danger." A 
great deal depends upon the interpretation put upon these words. 
Lord Sandhurst, a man eminently qualified for the task as a 
soldier and statesman, with large Indian and European experience, 
controverted Sir Henry Rawlinson's views in an article which 
appeared in the -Edinburgh Review of Suly 1875. He had 
previously, as Commander-in-Chief in India, recorded his dissent 
from Sir Henry Rawlinson's memorandum on the Central Asian 
question, dated 20th July, 1868, which had been forwarded to 
India by order of the Secretary of State. All the other members 
of the Indian Government, which it may be remarked was at that 
time exceptionally strong in ability and in Indian experience, 
expressed, at great length, their deliberate judgment upon this 
memorandum. The opinions also of officers holding high employ- 
. The meaning of 
ysicd d8culties of 
past experience of 
d present iinancial 
L in such astounding 
5.r John McNeiU, 
tte of the forward 
iis book, l r  EnglandJ-*' 
shed as a sort of 
It  is indeed a mine 
h Central Asia and 
rritten entirely &om 
incere, conviction of 
pose of territorial 
te object of hostile 
7 writes :-(( I take 
is 1865 I forecasted 
:h as it has since 
which I now recur, 
o man the outposts 
in order to prevent 
Real danger." A 
upon these words. 
for the task as a 
tropean experience, 
an article which 
1875. H e  had 
corded his dissent 
the Central Asian 
w n  forwarded to 
he other members 
mked was at that 
idian experience, 
! p e n t  upon this 
h g  high employ- 
ment on the North-West frontier were collected and sent home 
with the minutes of the Government to the Duke of Argyll as 
accompaniments to the Government despatch of the 4.th January, 
18G9, of -which it will be sufficient to quote the two following 
paragraphs :- 
ti The various proposals brought forward in that memorandum, in 
order to counteract in some measure the advances of Russia in Central 
Asia, and to strengthen the influence and power of England in 
Afghnnistizn and Persia, have received from us that careful consideration 
wliich is due to the well-known career and abilities of the writer, and to 
the magnitude of the events and interests of which he has treated. A 
careful perusal of the memorandum forwarded to us, and a further dis- 
cussion of the subject in all its bearing, has not led us to  mec commend ally 
substantial alteration in the course of policy to be adopted on the frontier 
or beyond it. On the contrary, the closer and more constant the atten- 
tion which the subject receives at our hands, the more settled is our con- 
viction that any serious departure from the principles which we have 
already exlunciated woulc! be the cause of grave political and financial 
embarrassments, and would probably involve us in doubtful under- 
takings, the issue and duration of which no Statesman would venture to 
predict." 
To one who has been associated with Sir Henry Rawlinson in 
public life, and who'has always entertained a high opinion of his 
ability, industry, and rare knowledge on all topics connected with 
the East, but has still felt i t  his duty t o  oppose his views, it is 
matter of surprise, and it may be added sorrow, to find that, in 
spite of the overwhelming weight of authority which so long 
resisted his forward policy, as unsound and dangerous, that policy 
has at length obtained the ascendency in the Councils of the 
British ~ r a ~ i r e !  It is to be hoped that Sir Henry and the abler 
advocates of his side of the question will be moderate in their 
triumph, and give no countenance to the schemes of annexation, 
and large extension of frontier, which find support in many 
quarters, end which it is understood Lord Lytton favours." Sir 
Henry Ramlinson has himself denounced " the iniquity of 
extinguishing independent States for the mere purpose of obtaining 
a convenient line of territorial demarcation." On every question 
connected with Persia, Sir Henry Rawlinson speaks with high 
authority ; but his suggestion, that it would be better for England 
to meet Russia (coming as an invader of India) in Persia rather 
than upon our Indian frontier, Lord Sandhurst pronounces to be 
r r  one of the wildest which ever crossed the imagination of a 
military diplomatist labouring under a 6xed idea." 
Sir Henry Rawlinson would also make the Russian advance 
to Merv a casus belli. He writes So long as she held aloof 
from Merv we should hold aloof from HerLt ; but if she deliberately 
threw down the gauntlet, she must expect it to be taken up." 
He attaches paramount importance to Hertit, as the key to India, 
and considers that an expeditionary column detached from India 
to hold it need not exceed a strength of 10,000 men, 5,000 only 
being allotted to  the garrison of HerPt, the remainder for the 
occupation of Gerishk, Furrah, Gandahar, Quettah, and Pisheen. 
Lord Sandhurst considered this force too small to occupy so 
many forts, and protect such a long line of operations. I n  order 
to subdue a single tribe of Afghans, General Wilde, an ex- 
perienced frontier officer, demanded 20,000 men. In  the Umbeyla 
expedition in 1863, we lost 36 British officers, and 871 British 
and native soldiers killed and wounded. It should be recollected 
1 that convoys, with supplies and munitions of war for the troops, 
must constantly be passing to and fro, exposed to attacks from 
hostile tribes, and that, at such a distance from our base, provision 
must be made for unwonted sickness, which very often in these 
countries greatly reduces the strength of regiments. Lord 
Sandhurst estimated the force required at 31,000, instead of 
10,000 troops, and the number deemed necessary for our present 
advance into Afghanistan exceeds even this larger estimate. 
Sir Henry Rawlinson, however, professed to believe that we 
should be able to carry out the policy he recommended in concert 
with the Afghans and with the Amir; but he was prepared for 
the other alternative, as he added :- 
Of course if the perversity of the Amir were to continue, and he 
were inclined to thwa;rt the expedition, from feelings of jealousy, or from 
a mistrust of our intentions, the disculties of the march would be much 
increased, and our preparations would require to be made upon a larger 
scale, including, perhaps, a demonstration at the mouth of the IChyber ; 
but under no circumstances need the expeditionary column, as far as I can 
form an opinion, exceed a strength of 10,000 men." 
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With regard to the occupation of Quettah, Sir Henry 
Rawlinson also assumed that we had the concurrence of the 
Amir, and his language deserves to be weighed in reference to 
the causes that have led to the present war :- 
ti It  is doubtful," he writes, " h o v  far such a proceeding would be re- 
garded at Candahar and Cabul. If our positiou were already secured 
vitEi Sher Ali Khan, and he could thus be led to look upon t h o  Quettah 
post as a support to his own power, then me should hardly be deterred 
from undertaking it  by mere considerations of expense; but if, as is more 
probable the tribes in general regarded the erection of a fortress above 
the passee as a menace, or as a preliminary to a further liostile advance, 
then we should not be justified for so small an object in risking the 
rupture of our friendly intercour~e.~' 
This is a very significant admission in respect to one of Lord 
Lytton's measures on the part of a strong advocate of the forward 
policy. All Statesmen, from the time of Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
have been of opinion that we should go to Afghanistan as defend- 
ers, and not as invaders. The Afghans mould receive aid against 
invaders with gratitude, and if they needed aid they mould be 
quick enough in asking for i t  ; for, as Sir Harry Lumsden mrites, 
" modesty has never been an Afghan weakness ; " but whatever 
Power invaded their country they would be glad to seek the 
alliance of any other Power to drive them out. 
"ir Bartle Frere's ~iews*rnay be gathered from his 
elaborate letter to  Sir John Kaye, of June 12th, 1874, 
and from an important memorandum, dated 10th Novem- 
ber of the same year. In  opposition to  Sir Henry Rawlinson, 
he deprecates the idea of making the advance of the Russians 
to Merv a casus 6eZZi:-ccThe place is nothing to us except 
as a necessary step towards Heriit and Cabul, nmd it is not a 
necessary step to either." He emphatically condemns our "negative 
policy," but he admits that " a defensive policy is not necessarily 
inactive, nor merely stationary, still less is it necessarily weak." 
This is the very point for which those who stand on the ancient 
ways contend. The active measures which seem to him to be 
essential are-lst, the placing of an advanced post at Quettah ; 
2ndly, well-selected English agents should be stationed at HerAt, 
Cabul, and Candahar, thus establishing a ~erfect intelligence de- 
partment of European officers in Afghanistan. He would not 
attempt the subjugation of the country nor its military occupa- 
tion, nor would he hold Heriit by a force of our own troops; a t  
least, not until we had tried the effect of such measures as Todd, 
and Pottinger, and Rawlinson proved could be so effectual in  like 
cases." These instances, adduced by Sir Bartle Frere in support 
of his argument, appear to be singularly unfortunate. The ~ o l i t i -  
cal assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger, stationed at  Shikarpore, i n  
Sinde, in 1838-1840, had access to all the correspondence, 
official and non-official, connected with the period Todd and Pot- 
tinger were at Heriit. Pottinger's heroic conduct in saving that 
city from the Persians ought to have ensured him the eternal 
gratitude of the Heriit Chief and his people. But not two months 
after the siege Pottinger was subjected to  the grossest treatment, 
insulted in the presence of the King, and ordered to leave the 
Herkt territory. He was then asked to remain, but was again 
insulted, his house attacked, and one of his servants seized and 
publicly mutilated. 
The amount of Todd's expenditure at Heriit used to startle 
the officers of the Sinde Residency, for they had the means of 
knowing what was going on from the Shikarpore merchants, 
through whom many of the bills were cashed. Sir John Login, 
who was attached to Todd's mission as surgeon, states that the 
advances amounted to .S190,000 in a short period. They have 
been estimated at upwards of $300,000. Yar Mahorned Khan 
received $2,500 a month, and during all this time he was carry- 
ing on a treacherous correspondence with the Persian Governor of 
Mushed, having for its object the expulsion of the infidel English 
from Afghanistan. Just as Sultan Mahomed Khan, the 
brother of Dost; Mahorned, whom we loaded with benefits, 
requited us by betraying to the Sikhs our officers who 
had taken refuge with him after the outbreak a t  PeshaWur. 
Finally, Major Todd, unable t o  submit any longer to the 
humiliating insults of an ungrateful miscreant (to use tilo 
words of Sir John Login), withdrew the mission to Candahar. 
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Under these circumstances, what Sir Bartle Frere can mean, 
by afiming that the measures adopted by Todd and Pothger  
proved effectual, it is difficult to understand. Sir Henry 
Rawlinson was shut up in Candahar with Sir Wm. Nott's 
division of the Cabul army. There is no analogy between his 
position under the wing of a large military force and that of 
officers stationed in isolated situations, like Herkt and BaIkh, 
dependent upon their individual influence, and the prestige of 
distant British power. 
. ' This question of stationing British officers in Afghanistan may 
not seem of great moment to those unacquainted with the 
afghan character. The English mind can scarcely understand 
the repugnance exhibited by Dost Mahomed and Sher Ali. Lord 
Salisbury, having no knowledge on the subject, dismissed it in the 
House of Lords with the remark, "If an ally could on such 
a ground exhibit any soreness of feeling, I cannot thinlc he can 
be an ally about whose temper we need trouble ourselves much." 
Eyed Noor Mahomed, Prime Minister of Cabul, who was 
more immediately concerned, says :-'' Grey Sahib wrote me a letter 
recently, referring to my acquiescence, when at Simlah, to the 
coming of British officers to Cabul. It was as much as an order 
for my death."*' The atmosphere of Cabul in such matters i~ very 
different to that of the House of Lords, as Lord Salisbury would per- 
ceive if he were suddenly transported to the Capital of Afghanistan. 
Lord Lytton also, looking at the question from a purely 
English point of view, considers that " the presence and every- 
day acts in their midst of earnest, upright English gentlemen" 
was the one thing required to cidize the Afghans. To those who 
know the Afghans from the habit of daily intercourse with them, 
these words of the Viceroy denote an ingenuous simplicity, and 
tend to provoke an involuntary smile. " Earnest, upright 
English gentlemen " would have little chance of influencing Chiefs 
like Yar Mahomed Khan, unless endowed with other and rarer 
qualities ; and their (( every-day acts " would be as distasteful to 
fanatical Noollahs, Mouluvees, and Mohammedans, as the every- 
day acts of Afghan Chiefs and people would be distasteful to 
* '' Afghanistan Correspondence," p. 195. 
i( 
Eng& minds. Sir Bartle Frere says :--"Train up men like 
Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Metcave ; " but such men are not as 
plentiful as blackberries, even in services of which Mr. Canning 
long ago said "that no monarchy in Europe had produced 
within a time so many men of the first talents in civil and 
military life within the same period." 
Dost Mahomed may be supposed to have known the 
temper of his countrymen better than Lord Lytton, and with 
all his desire to cement a friendly union with the English, 
the one thing he ehrank from was a British officer, as 
drg-nurse, at his Capital, Gholam Houssein Khan, whose fidelity 
to British interests has never been doubted, and whose oppor- 
tunities for forming a judgment must be allowed to .have been 
exceptional, gave the same advice. ;8 Sir Harry Lumsden also 
writes :- " Unless under the most pressing danger to Afghan- 
istan! and at the spontaneous and urgent demand of that 
Government itself, no proposition involving the deputing British 
officers into the country should, for a moment, be entertained. ,, 
It has been the fixed and settled opinion of the various eminent 
men who have ruled India before Lord Lytton, that "one of 
the best securities for success and harmony in our dealings 
with the Afghans, and for the avoidance of embarrassments, 
consisted in our having as few points of contact with them as 
possible." 
W e  have in previous paragraphs passed rapidly in review some 
of the main features of the recommendations and suggestions 
advanced by the most eminent advocates of " the forward policy." 
Following in the train of these greater luminaries are numerous 
satellites of inferior brilliancy, whose schemes for the preservation 
of our Indian Empire from' Russian aggression take a wideT 
range, and embrace measures which would seem to require a 
fathomless exchequer and a perennial supply of soldiers, which 
om chimean experiences would scarcely give us wmrant to 
believe that the British Islands could furnish. Many of these 
writers are not satisfied wItb rectifying our frontier in India by 
0btaLJng a footing in Afghanistan, and by gmrisoning Her$t, 
rain up men like Candahar, BaGh, and Cab~l,  but they mould our 
:h men are not as 
. to  the Oxus, and some even contemplate mith comn~lnccncy hostile 
bich Mr. Canning expeditions to the deserts of Central Asia. AS a specimen of 
e had produced the ~ m ~ e r i a l  scope of such projects, it d l  be s&cient to quote 
hnts in civil and from a recent letter, published in the Scotsman, aud ir;msferred 
. to  the Morning P o s t ,  of the 1 l t h  October, 1878. Afteter 
.ave known the to  the ~ossibility of a Russian advance "by Persia. and the 
rytton, and with valley of the Attreck to HerAtJJ' the writer goes on :- 
" In  the meantime, what should England be doing? Clwrying out 
heartily the Anglo-Turkish Convention ; constructing s railway fronl tho 
Bosphorus to Bagdad, another from the Mediterranean to join it, and 
another branch to Erzeroum; making roads in all directions, both for 
commercial and strategicul purposes ; encouraging, and cyt!ating if neces- 
sary, a large steam flotilla on the Tigris; pos~essing ourselves, by 
Y Lumsden also purchase or otherwise, of tlie Island of Karrack. With all this, preparing 
by every mean8 a strong military position near Erzeroum." 
I t  is worthy of remark) and of serious consideration, that the 
Prime Minister endorses this proposition in his speech at the 
Mansion House, in which he stated that "the city of Erzeroum 
various eminent mill in all probability be the scene of the strongest fortifications 
in Asia Minor." But to return to the work that the 
writer of the letter in the Momzing Post  cuts out for 
embarrassments, English brains and English money :- 
,t ~ 6 t h  them as g L  Surveying all the passes leading from Asia Minor into Persia, 
aiding in every way in the regeneration of the Tu~.kish army by lending 
[Y in review some British officers, &c." 
"If we make proper use of the time we shall have at  our disposn1,Tt.e 
are numerous ought to be able to collect in that  country (Asia Illinor) at short notice (shorter than Russia could collect 10V,000 men a t  Herht) 60~,000 men- the preservation British, Turks, and Indians. With such a force at our disposal, we 
n take a wider ought to be able to hold in check the Russian army of the Caucasus, and 
TI. t o  require a in addition t o  form columns which could enter Persia in diiferent 
directions through the Western frontier, and attack the rear as well as 
soldiers, wEch the  corrlrnunicatione of any Russian army in its advance onIndia." (This 
us warrant to is Sir Henry Rawlinson's idea, comme~lted on by Lord Sandhnrst.) 
Many of these a Further, another force, dispatched from India to the Persian Gulf, 
could operate from the South, while {ram Beloochistm a force could act 
from the East-in fact, holding Asia Minor, we could absolutely para l~ze  
Per& from the West and from the East and from the South." 
A.little further on, in the same letter, we find :- 
" I n  spite of every opposition on the part of many eminent men, tho 
Indian Government has been induced to occupy Quettall, in Beloochistan, 
which position is being turned into a powerful 'place d'arnles,' in which 
a British army could assemble with all the resources of England and 
India at its back, and meet the advance of a Russian one." 
Again :- 
" I have now tried to point out that if we carry out the Anglo- 
Turkish Convention, and have as a condition, absolutely essential, the 
alliance of Turkey, we have nothing t o  fenr from Russia. But Russia 
knows as well as we do the necessity of a Turlrish alliance to us, and 
every effort will be made by her to provent its being realized. She holds 
in her hand a fearful weapon to use in her favour-the indemnity, and it 
would be worth our while to pay it ourselves sooner than lose the 
alliance of Turkey ! '' 
This last proposition, surely, is a climax. It is piling Pelion 
on Ossa with a vengeance on the shoulders of British tax-payers. 
AB we read, with bated breath, the startling list of all we ought 
to undertake to preserve ourselves from the machinations of 
Russia, the reflection could not but arise, Who is sufficient for 
these things? But when we are told that we are to pay the 
Turkish indemnity, there is a feeling of relief, because we may be 
certain that even the blandest and most audacious of Chancellors 
of the Exchequer, however imbued with Imperial doctrines, would 
hardly venture, especially after the experiment of the Rhodope 
grant, to make such a proposition to Parliament. Money, the sinews 
of war, is the great want of Russia, and we ourselves are to 
supply this want, and for what purpose ? to secure the alliance of 
Turkey. It does aot seem at all incredible to those who have 
studied the cavernous worltings of the Asiatic mind, that before 
any great length of time we may be brought to loggerheads with 
our fiends the Turks. Nountstuart Elphinstone, no mean 
observer of the teachings of history, wrote long ago :-"I never 
knew a close alliance between a civilized and an uncivilized State 
that did not end in mutual hatred in  three years. Our payment 
of the Turkish indemnity would be worse than our pouring thou- 
sands into the lap of P a r  Mahomed W a n  of Herfit, all the time 
that the wily Afghan Chief was chuckling in his sleeve, and 
telling the E n g  of Persia, the Asylum of Islam, that " he merely 
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tolerated the presence of the English Envoy from expediency, as 
he (the Envoy) was by no means niggardly in the expenditure, 
jewels," &c. If this sort of language is used to the TurksJ they 
must indeed believe that we are in great straits for their alliance, 
and that no demands which they could make would be too onerous 
for us to grant. " Capital fellows these Feringhees" (the 
Belooches used to say on the occasion of our fist  ad~ance to 
Afghanistan.) ('We sell them our camels one day, steal them 
the next, and sell them again to them on the third day." All 
# 
these suggestions must appear, one would imagine, to soberminded 
practical Englishmen as dreams, vague unsubstantial dreams, like 
those put forward in former years, that England should go to war 
with France to prevent the annexation of Savoy and Nice, or step 
in with armed interference t o  forbid her acquisition of the left 
bank of the Rhine ; or, at a still later date, that Germany should 
be coerced into the relinquishment of any claim she might make 
to the possession of French territory. But these are not the sug- 
gestions of " anonymous paragraph miters," nor the harebrained 
chatter of irresponsible frivolity ;" they are the deliberate and 
matured recommendations of General Sir Henry Green, a dis- 
tinguished military and political officer, who has done excellent 
service on the Sinde frontier, and has always been one of the 
busiest and most persistent advocates " of the forvard policy." 
His letter was published in the Xcotsman, as was said, at the 
request of the Duke of Sutherland, who endorsed its sentiments as 
emanating from an Officer who had spent his life in India, chiefly 
in Afghanistan and Beloochistan, and who mas well able to judge 
of the effect of European politics on the minds of the natives of 
India. 
pi' Moreover, these views are to a certain extent recognized and 
sanctioned by the Prime Minister himself, as we can gather from J 
his speech at the Mansion House, and from other utterances. 
They are built up on the same foundation as the secret Anglo- 
Turkish Convention, which gave us " peace with honour ;" they 
are conceived in the same spirit which would fain make US believe 
that Gypus was an outlying bulwark of the British Empire, and 
a defensive post for our Indian territories. The Prime Minister 
tells us that " if Asia Minor and the valley of the Eupllrates were 
in the possession of a very weak, or a very powerful State, it  ! i 
would be by no means impossible for an adequate army to march 
through the passes of Asia Minor, and through Persia, and 
absolutely threaten tlie dominions of the Queen." Here we I 
have the germs of the suggestions of Sir IIenry Green, o.l"ththc new 
Imperial policy, which Lord Lytton was sent out to India to I 
inaugurate, and which no doubt found a responsive echo in his 
ardent and poetical imagination. The same master mind which 
has linked free and enlightened England, teeming with life and 
progress, to an effete and docaying Sovereignty, approaching the *I, 
last stage of decomposition, which has pledged British resources 
t o  fight the battle of the Turks, and meet a formidable adversary 
on her own ground irl Asia Minor, no doubt contemplated with 
satisfaction the rectification of our Indian fronticr, and the loca- 
tion of British troops in the midst of a hostile population, on the 
confines of the Hindoo Koosh mountains, or on tlie edge of the 
Turlrumnn deserts. In  this lies the grand distinction between 
the old policy of Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and 
Lord Northbrook, and of the successive Ministries undcr whom 
they served, and the new Imperial? policy of Lord Lytton, Lord 
Salisbury, and Lord Beaconsfield. The marvel is that, with this 
broad distinction existing, which must be patent to all men now 
that it is revealed, Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote 
should have both stated, so late as June 1877, that there wm 
no change in the policy of the ~overnment."' 
The first result of the new policy is an unnecessary, impolitic, 
and unjust war;  but before we proceed to substantiate this 
charge, and to show that the measures adopted by Lord Lytton 
have been the main cause of this great cclalnity, it will be 
necessary to explain the state of affairs on the North-Westcm 
frontier at the period of Lord Lytton's arrival in India. Onc of 
the first questions Lord Lytton had to decide was connected with 
the Khan of Khelat, and the tribes which owe him more or less 
real allegiance. This question had been constantly before Lord 
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Northbrook's Government throughout his administration, and 
h a d  given rise to voluminous correspondence. At length matters 
h a d  reached such a state that the Comtnissioner in Sinde, Sir 
William Merewether, had recommended armed intervention. 
T o  this Lord Northbrook would not consent, but at the same 
time he determined that a complete change of policy must take 
place. We had hitherto endeavoured to deal with the frontier 
tribes entirely through the Khan, giving them to understand 
tha t  they were regarded solely as his subjects. This policy, after 
long and patient trial, had failed. It was now decided to make 
our own arrangements direct with the frontier tribes, or rather 
t o  mediate between the Ehan and the Chiefs of the tribes, thus 
treating the Khan molpe as prinaus inter pares than the absolute 
Ruler of the country. Before the measures requisite to  inaugumte 
this new policy were completed, Lord Northbrook quitted India, 
and Lord Lytton succeeded him, and proceeded t o  carry out the 
details in a digerent spirit, and with a different object. I n  
order to bring out the striking contrast between the measures of 
Lord Northbrook and Lord Lytton, a reference may be made to 
one of Lord Lytton's speeches (commenting on Sir John Strrtchey's 
financial statement of March 1877), in which he uses the 
strongest condemnatory language in regard to the policy of his 
predecessors in the Viceroyalty. He says :- 
"Those neighbouring regions, after twenty-five p a r s  of the closest 
geographical contact between us and them, remained almost the only 
ones in the whole world which are forbidden ground to British fnotsteps, 
except on some mission of vengeance, and for the purpose of' burning 
the  homes and destroying the property of our neighbours, in retaliation 
for outrages committed by them upon our own territory. Surely this is 
not a etate of things which any Englishman can contemplate with 
unmitigated satisfaction, or which any English States~nan mould wish to 
perpetuate. . . . I do not think that, consistently with its high duties 
to God and man, as the greatest civilizing Power, this Government can 
watolz, coldly and immoveably, its closest neighbours floundering in 
anarchy and bloodshed without extending to them, i n  their hour of need, 
a kindly and a helpful hand, if they seek its assistance and invoke its 
guidance. Such a policy would be, in  my opinion, an atheistic and 
inburnan one.'' 
What  the exact meaning the Viceroy intended to convey by 
I D 
the use of the word ( f  atheistic " it is difficult to determine, but 
the word inhuman" is easily understood. Lord Lytton had 
only been a few months in India; his ~revious training and 
experience had given him no acquaintance with Indian affdrs, or 
qualified him in any way to pronounce an authoritative judgment 
on a difficult administrative ~roblem, to the solution of which the 
best intellects and the largest practical experience of officers of 
the Indian civil and military services had been devoted since the 
time when the Punjab came under British rule. Lord Lytton 
had evidently not read carefully the despatches of the l3ome 
Authorities, nor the reports of the officers employed on the 
frontier, but formed a hasty opinion from imperfect information, 
and clothed it in strong expressions. Had he studied the question 
he mould have found that the orders sent out by the various 
Secretaries of State, and acted upon by the Lieutenant-Governors, 
and the able officers employed under them, inculcated anything 
but " an atheistic and inhuman " policy. The following para- 
graphs from a despatch by Lord Halifkx, dated 16th January, 
1864, after the Umbeyla campaign, gives in detail his views of 
the policy to be pursued towards the tribes on the North-West 
frontier :- 
a Our true course oi~ght to be not to interfere with their internal 
concerns, but t o  cultivate friendly relations with them, and to endeavour 
to convince them, by our forbearance and kindly conduct, that their 
wisest plan is to be on good terms with us, in order that they may derive 
those advantages from intercourse with us which are sure to follow the 
interchange of commodities and mutual benefits." Again :- " Advantage 
should be taken of every opportunity to conciliate the Ohiefs of these 
tribes, and to create and iniprove a friendly feeling in the minds of these 
here,ditary leaders, whether religious or otherwise, who in semi-barbarous 
communities usually exercise so great an influence over the minds of their 
followers, and whose own conduct, when not influenced by caprice, is gener- 
ally determillet1 by self-interest." Again :-"It is of paramount importance 
that these Chiefs should be made to understand that our policy is peace, 
and, while resolute to repel and chastise any aggl-ession upon our own 
territories, we do not seek to extend our frontier, nor do we desire to 
interfere with our neighbours." 
These we believe to have been the principles which animated 
and directed our officers from the earliest period after the annex- 
ation of the Punjab. 
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Can any exception be taken to this policy of conciliation 
1 mingled with firmness-the determination to uphold British 
I supremacy, in order to afford protection to British subjects living i n  the vicinity of the frontier, and yet at the same time to use 
i every effort to cultivate friendly relations with the mild and 
independent tribes inhabiting the mountain ranges ? Is it just to 
brand such a policy with the epithets of atheistic and inhuman? 
*.)" I f  rurnour is to be credited, Lord Lytton soars above details, and 
he has probably, therefore, never turned his attention to the deeply 
interesting and instr~ictive reports of the Punjab administration, 
nor even to the published statements of the moral and material 
progress of India, presented annually to Parliament.' These 
statements are not exhaustive of the numerous subjects of which 
they treat, and they are very unequal, depending on the industry 
and ability of the officer selected to prepare them ; but they are 
founded on authentic documents at the India Office, and are 
generally compiled with care and judgment. An attentive perusal 
of them shows a gradual improvement in our relations with the 
frontier tribes, that the border has of late years become decidedly 
more peaceable, axid that there are causes at work, certain, if not 
interfered with, to produce, in course of time, most important 
results. The establishment of hospitals and dispensaries, the 
offer of waste lands on liberal terms, the interchange of friendly 
visits, and, above all, the admittance into the ranks of our army, 
police, and civil establishments, of large and increasing numbers of 
these border tribes, are measures tending gradually to create 
respect for our power, and confidence in our good feeling and 
justice. The philanthropic efforts of British officers employed on 
the frontier are beyond all praise ; they are known to few, but 
they reflect the highest credit on the officers and on their country. 
Many of them, no doubt, read with pain Lord. Lytton's hasty 
and unjust remarks, betraying such a want of knowledge of the 
subject, and such an absence of due appreciation of their 
persevering and self-denying labours. The same precipitation 
and inexperience in Asiatic modes of thought, usages, and 
prejudices characterize Lord Lytton's conduct in reference to the 
affars of Afghanistan, and have mainly contributed to the present I 
rupture with the Amir of Cabul. -' 
All the proceedings, however, of Lord Lytton have met with 
the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government, and both 
Houses of Parliament have ratified that approval, after a very 
brief time afforded them for studying the correspondence connected 
with this important question. It remains to be seen whether the 
people of England when they have had the opportunity of examin- 
ing the whole case will confirm the verdict. Those who believe 
that the new policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and 
carried out in such a h a ~ t y  and inconsiderate manner by Lord 
Lytton, has plunged the country into an impolitic and unjust war 
are bound to use their best endeavours to place the facts of the 
case before their countrymen. In furtherance of the instructions 
conveyed t o  him by Lord Salisbury in his Despatch of the 28th 
February, 1876, the first step talcen by Lord Lytton on his arrival 
in India mas to send his Native ~ide-de-Camp Resaldar Major 
Khanan Khan, with' a letter to the Amir dated 5th May, 1876, 
bmely twenty-five days after his assumption of the Viceroyalty, 
announcing a proposed British Mission to Cabul. Sher Ali 
declined to receive this Mission ; and we learn from Lord LyttonJs 
IJespatch of 10th May, 1877, that his grounds were "that he 
desired no change in his relations with the British Government, 
which appeared to have been defined by that Government to its 
own satisfaction at the Simla Conference. I f  the British Govern- 
ment had now anything new to say about them, he would prefer 
to send his own Agent to the Viceroy, in order that the subjects 
of discussion weighed by a minute and exact investigation, night 
be committed to writing." / Sir William Muir has recorded his 
opinion that Sher Ali's refusal was couched c c  in as courteous 
terms as the case admitted." But Lord Lytton to,ok offence 
immediately, as if he desired to seize the first opportunity and pre- 
text for pushing matters to extremities. I t  must be borne in 
mind that Sher Ali firmly believed, that under the solemn promise 
of Lord Mayo, he might consider himself safe from having British 
Officers forced upon him against his will, and against the wishes 
of his Chief6 and people. I 
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Lord Northbrook distinctly states, when Syed Noor Mahomed 
objected to the step on similar grounds, that "he felt he had no 
right under the assurance that had been given by Lord Mayo, 
t h a t  British Officers should not be sent against the opinion of the 
Amir, to consider that any offence had been committed against 
the British Government." Lord Lytton was of a different 
opinion, and but for the interposition of the more experienced 
members of his Council, he would have written to  the Amir in 
s u c h  menacing terms that a favourable answer could hardly have 
b e e n  expected, and the British Government would then have 
b e e n  placed at the very outset in the embarrassing position either 
of sitting down quietly under an open affront, or of being com- 
pel led  to have recourse to measures of coercion. Eventually a 
modified letter was addressed to Sher Ali, dated the 8th July, 
1 8 7 6 ,  closing with the intimation amounting to a threat, that if 
he hastily rejected the hand of friendship, the Viceroy would be 
obliged to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily 
isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British 
Government." Lord Lytton writes at this time :-" We authorized 
Dr. Bellew and others t o  address the Amir and his Ministers 
letters, unofficially explaining our sentiments, and the importance 
of the opportunity then offered to the Afghan Government for 
materially strengthening its position at home and abroad.'' TGE 
appears  to have been a very unusual and illad6ed step, as i t  
w o u l d  only tend to  confuse and perplex the Amir, and to make 
h im suspicious of his Ministers. The thought would occur to 
h im that underneath dl this pressure there was same deep-laid 
scheme, which threatened his own interests, and Eoded ill for 
Bfghan independence. Asiatics are naturally suspicious, especially 
the Afghans, and to negotiate successfully with them it is important 
to pursue a simple straightforward course, and to deal with the 
Chief ,  and not with his subordinates. - Finally, the Amir sends 
an answer submitting two alternative propositions. Lord ' Lytton 
accepts the second, that the British Vakeel at Cabul should 
proceed t o  Simla, charged with a conGdentia1 explanation "of 
the personal views and sentiments of the Amir on the subject 
of his relations with the British Government." 
The British Agent, Nawab Atta Mahomed W a n ,  reached 
Simla on the 6th of October, 1876, and on the next day Sir 
Lewis Pelly, Lieut.-Colonel 0. T. Burne, and Captain Grey had. 
an interview with him. A summary of the conversation that 
took place is given in the Afghanistan Papers (p. 180). Atta 
Mihorned assigns eight reasons for the estrangement of the Amir. 
1. The decision on the Seistan boundary. 
2. Our recent proceedings in Khelat territories. 
3. Our remonstrances, in 1874, on behalf of Y akoob Khan. 
4. The transmission-of presents to Walrhan. 
5. The results of the mission of Syed Noor Mahomed in 
1873. 
6. Matter contained in a recent letter from the Commissioner 
of Peshawur to the British Agent at Cabul. 
7. The Amir's impression that our policy is one of self- 
interest, irrespective of the interests of Afghanistan. 
8. Our refusal to sign a definite treaty of alliance in 1873. 
Lord Lytton, in his letter to Lord Salisbury, of 10th May, 
1877, alludes to only four of these grievances-the first, third, 
fourth, and eighth,-all of which occurred before his accession to 
the Viceroyalty. It is not necessary to dwell on each of these 
four grievances, but it may be observed that not one of them 
afforded any just ground of complaint against the British Govern- 
ment. h!&uch of the ill feeling, therefore, manifested by Sher Ali 
must be attributed to his own morbid temperament. Sir Harry 
Lumsden described him, twenty years ago, " as a man of violent 
temper and cruel disposition," but " possessed of intelligence 
and aptitude for business." He is prone to fits of depression, 
causing, at times, the belief in his insanity. His conduct, on the 
death of his favourite son, Mahommed Ali, at the battle of 
Eujbaz, gave countenance to this belief. I n  dealing with a man 
of this disposition, a Viceroy, desirous of promoting peace, would 
have been slow to take gffence, and would have exercised more 
than usual forbearance. ; The decision with regard to the Seistan 
boundasy in 1872, no doubt excited a deep feeling of re~entment 
in the mind of Sher Ali. The objects of the British Government 
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I ' were whollf disinterested. They desired to remove a cause of 
I ' ,  
i ' - quarrel between Persia and Afghanistan, and to  avert, if 6 ."" 
possible, the chance of collision and bloodshed. No officer better 
fitted to carry out their wishes could have been selected as Com- 
missioner than Rir Frederick Goldsmid, but he was thwarted 
throughout by Mirza llaasim Khan, the Persian Commissioner, 
whose conduct affarded sufficient ground for breaking up the 
Commission, and leaving the question for settlement at TehrAn. 
This would have been the wisest plan, as, although the decision of 
the British Commissioner was perfectly equitable, it gave offence 
both to Persia and to Sher Ali. The less we interfere with the 
internal affairs and disputes of Asiatic Rulers the better. 
Lord Lytton makes no mention of the second alleged griev- 
ance-" the recent proceedings in the Khelat territories." These 
included the occupation of Quettah, which the Bmir described to 
the Turkish Envoy as "placing an armed man at the back door 
of his house," adding, "what can be his motive, except he wants 
to find his way in when you are asleep ?"* Under an article in 
our treaty a i t h  the Khan of Khelat, we had a perfect right to 
occupy Quettah, as it is situated in Khelat territory. But Lord 
Northbrook has stated that its occupation did not form part of his 
contemplated arrangements for the settlement of Welat affairs. 
As a significant step in the direction of Lord Lytton's rumoured 
policy, combined with the threatened advance of Eashmir troops 
towards Chitral, at our instigation, and the opening of new rela- 
tions with the Chiefs to  the north of the Oabul river, it naturally 
alarmed the Amir. At this period, also, preparations were being 
made on the banks of the Indus in the collection of supplies a~id 
means of transport ; a bridge of boats was thrown across the river 
at Eooshalgur, and the air was full of warlilce rumours. No 
wonder the Amir became anxious and distrustful. Sir Henry 
Rawlinson suggests that "it was the Amir's consciousness of his 
*This forcible expression of the hmfr, uttered to the Turkish Envoy in the 
confidence of private intercourse with cr coseligionist, is strong e~idence of his 
feelings on the subject of the ocoupation of Quetteh. It is related in 1Mr. 
Grattan Geary'~ Work, " Through Asiatic Turkey," Vol. II., page 323, as com- 
municated to him by a Turkish politician at Constantinople. D 
own disloyalty which made him regard the movement on Quettah 
as a menace." ' But up to the time of Lord Lytton's aggressive 
measures, Sher Ali had shown no symptom of disloyaltyto us. AJ 
a weak State between two mighty Powers, he naturally felt sus- 
picious both of England and of Russia. Sir William Muir, when 
endeavouring to prevent the Viceroy fsom sending his menacing 
letter, mrites :-ccHitherto his whole h e  of conduct has ex- 
hibited an alarm and distrust of Russia, which has, up to the 
present time, made him entirely dependent upon us. w h a t  the 
effect of the present menacing letter may be it is impossible to 
foretell." Lord Northbrook and Sir Henry Norman both support 
this statement. 
Had we adherod to the wise policy of keeping within the 
boundary line which had marked the limits of our Indian 
territories for so many years, no cause of distrust could have 
arisen; and, on the first serious difficulty with Russia, Sher 
Bli would most probably have sought the protection of the 
British Government. It would seem evident to all unpre- 
judiced minds that, under the old aspect of affairs, Sher Ali 
and the Afghans would naturally cling t o  England rather than 
to Russia. Since the withdrawal of our armies from Cabul, the 
British Government has conferred nothing but benefits upon the 
Chiefs and people of Afghanistan. Constant intercourse must have 
made known generally the advantages of a British alliance, while 
the contrast between an aggressive and a non-aggressi~e Power 
must have tended to inspire confidence in us, and increasing 
distrust of Russia. The Afghans are a manly race, and admire 
manliness in others. The attachment shown by many of them 
who have enlisted in our ranks to their officers is remarkable. 
Personal friendships have also existed between British Officers 
and Afghan Chiefs. A l l  these elements of goodwill are in our 
favour in compi~rison with Russia. One deeprooted feeling, how- 
ever, separates alike the Englishman and the Russian from these 
Mohammedan nations-religious fanaticism, the spridgs of which 
are as obscure as the effects are tremendous.'' Baron Jomini, in 
arguing that he saw no reason for "mutual jealousy " between 
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England and Russia, remarked " that, should the two Govern- 
ments act more together, in the interests of general progress and 
civilization, i t  might be the means of strengthening both in their 
respective Eastern dominions, where a powerful antagonistic 
element existed in the Mussulman population, a menace to both 
Governments, and should at any time a leader of daring character 
arise, much was to be feared by such an event."" There is great truth 
in this observation, and Lord Lytton would do me11 to bear it in 
mind in his dealings with the contingents of Native Princes to  
further schemes of territorial aggrandizement. We are a handful 
of foreigners rulillg over conquered millions, and it  would be a 
fatal error to fritter away our military strength and resources, more 
especially *our European troops, in the distant regions of Afghan- 
istan. We can never trust to India as a secure base of operations 
as we would trust to England in the event of an European 
emergency. In any struggle with an European Power our mili- 
tary strength in India must be increased rather than diminished. 
I t  was a vain flourish of trumpets, which deceived no one 
acquainted with the true state of &airs in India, to bring native 
troops at  a vast expense to Europe with the view of intimidating 
Russia. 
On the 10th of October another meeting was held with 
Atta  Mahomed Khan, at which the Viceroy was present. Sir 
Lewis Pelly, Colonel Burne, and Captain Grey also attended. I t  
will be observed that the Foreign Secretary of the Government 
was absent from both of these important meetings, that is to say, 
the responsible head of the office through wwhich the Viceroy's 
communications with all Chiefs and Princes are invariably con- 
ducted, was not present at discussions which had an important 
bearing on orders that he would eventually have to carry out. If 
the Foreign Secretary was unable to attend through illness, or any 
other cause, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department 
could have attended. This mas done in Lord Dalhousie's time in 
a similar contingency. Thus, also in regard to the affairs of 
Ehelat, it will be remembered that the Viceroy deputed his own 
Military Secretary to be the bearer of confidential communications 
* Central AAsia Papers," p. 45. 
to the Khan, and to the British political Officer at that Court. In  
the despatch of the 23rd of March, 1877, in vol. 2 ((Beloochistan 
Papers," paragraph 27, it is stated that "Colonel Colley carried 
out his mission with care and judgment." Admitting fully the 
qualifications of Colonel Colley, it is clear that he was only one 
of the officers of the Viceroy's own staff, and had no official or 
responsible position connected with the Government of India, 
neither had Colonel Burne as Private Secretary. The advice and 
assistance of these officers in their proper sphere are calculated to 
be of great value to the Viceroy, but that is not a solid ground 
for dowing them to supersede the regularly-appointed officers of 1 
the Government of India, who are the responsible advisers of the I 
Government, and a h o  possess, what officers on the staff 
of tbe Viceroy generally do not, trained experience in the working 
of our Indian Administration, and are therefore better fitted to 
carry out the decisions of the Government. One of the disad- 
vantages of this irregular proceeding was, as will be remarked in 
this case, that there is no official record of inst~uctions to Colonel . I I 
Colley, nor any formal report from him. Under the old system i 
of government, these irregularities would have been animadverted 
upon by the Home Authorities. I n  connection with this new 
mode of transacting business we have, in the published 1 
"Afghanistan Correspondence," extracts &om private notes and 1 
memoranda put forward to establish certain important points (the 
details, for instance, of what passed at the Umballa Conference) 
which have been shown to have been positively incorrect. I n  fact, 
in one instance, a gentleman not present at an interview is I 
i 
allowed, years afterwards, to put his own interpretation on what I 
'pafised at the time, and what was really recorded then and there I 
by the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department. I 
At the second meeting with Atta Mahorned, Lord Lytton 
took occasion to explain to him, as he said subsequently, 
, 
I 
l 
without reserve all that he had in his mind ; he had no doubt I 1 
that the British Agent would convey this faithfully to the  Amir." 
How Lord Lytton, holding as he did in his hand the momentous 
issues of peace and war,.could conceive that the use of language, 
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so calculated to  provolre the bitterest feelings of hatred and 
indignation tion the breast of the Amir, was becorning the dignity 
of his high office, it is difficult to understand. Let us select a 
fev of the cl~oice expressioils of this conciliatory masage to Sher 
Ali:-"Our only interest in maintaining the independence of 
Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our o m  frontier. 
But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and 
kmly-allied State, what is there to prevent us from providing for 
the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia, 
which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the 
map altogether ? If the Amir does not desire to come to a 
speedy understanding with us, Russia does, and she desires it, at 
his expense." "If the Amir remained our fiiend, this military 
power (the British) could be spread round h m  as a ring of iron, 
and if he became our enemy, it could break him as a reed." 
" His own son is his opponent, conspiracies are rife in favour of 
his sonJ the people are discontented, the treasury is empty. The 
Amir's position is surrounded with difficulties. This is the man 
who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia, 
independent of either. His position is rather that of an earthen 
pipkin between two iron pots." This latter homely illustration, 
although, perhaps, Lord Lytton is not aware of it, is a term of 
low abuse amongst Orientals, and conveys a gross insult. Imagine 
Atta Mahorned's astonishment at such language in the mouth of 
the 'viceroy.' A chord of sympathy pervades the hearts of all 
Mohammedans. With many high qualities, and capacities for 
rule, they are a haughty, unforgiving, fanatical race ; they 
cherish the memories of their glorious Past ; and, doubtless, in his 
inner mind, Atta Mahomed felt the insult offered to the Bmir, 
and commented upon it, in no friendlyspirit to the British nation, 
when closeted with his co-religionists. 
" Is Be  the Angel Gabriel come down from heaven that he 
should talk to me in this manner.?" said an old Yohammedan 
Chief on the banks of the Indus forty years ago, when addressed 
in somewvhat similar language by a young political Agent,  hose 
careless words bore bitter fruit in after times of trouble. Mr. E. 
Schuyler tells us "that the Russians persondy have not so much 
of that contemptuous feeling which is so marked i n  the dealings 
of the Anglo-Saxon race with people of lower culture and civiliza- 
tion." The evil effects of such a pernicious example on the part 
of a Viceroy are incalculable. W e  read in Gibbon of the haughty 
message of the Mohammedan Caliph to the Roman Emperor in 
the VII I th  century, and its barbaric grandeur strikes the imagi- 
nation. " In  the name of the most merciful God, HQrGn A1 
Rashed, Commander of the Faithful, to Nicephorus the Roman 
dog. I have read thy letter, 0 thou Son of an unbelieving 
mother. Thou shalt not hear, thou shalt behold my reply." 
" Tt was written in characters of blood and fire on the plains of 
Phrygia." I n  the XIXth century we look for more measured 
language and Christian humility fkom a Viceroy, who, Lord 
Salisbury has the hardihood to tell the House of Lords, "in 
caution and sound hard discretion has never been exceeded by any 
Viceroy." The same Minister, when pressed home to explain his 
misleading and unsatisfactory replies, says boldly, with true 
Strafford ring, (' I n  the future no answer at al l  shall be given to 
questions of that kind." Let Xnglishmen who love the liberties 
of their country beware of such " Grand Viziers of government by 
~rerogative." On the 11th of October Lord Lytton addressed a 
letter to Sher Ali, and intrusted it  to Atta Mahomed Khan, who 
returned to Cabul at the end of that, month. ID this letter Lord 
Lytton sent an invitation to the Amir to attend the assemblage at  
Delhi on the 1st of January, 1877, for the proclamation of Her 
Majesty's Imperial title. This was a mistake. I t  was not likely 
that the Amir, as an independent Sovereign, would be flattered by 
the invitation, or would accept it, as it would place him on a level 
with the feudatory Princes of India. E e  returned no answer. 
Lord Lytton also intimated that Sir Lewis Pelly would meet She= 
Ali's Prime Minister at Peshawur, if the Amir still desired to 
enter into a treaty engagement. 
Various letters from Atta Mahorned, after his arrival at 
Cabul, state the result of discussions by Sher Ali's Ministers on 
the question of receiving British officers. c L  Such an arrangement 
flled them with apprehension." Their opinion was that this 
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request of the British Ciovernment should be declined." In the 
end, however, " owing to helplessness," "though considering that 
the residence of British officers would not at all be advantageous 
t o  the two Governments," the Amir consented, aIld his Prime 
Minister, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah, was despatched to PeshalWr, 
where he arrived on tho 27th January, 1877, in very iU health. 
Sir Lewis Pelly met him, and it may be remarked, without any 
imputation upon that officer, who has filled many responsible 
situations with credit, that his selection for this duty seems to 
have been unfortunate. His Sinde antecedents were not likely t o  
prepossess the Afghans in his favour, nor his previous connection 
with the Persian Mission at Tehrgn. He was a well-known sup- 
porter of the aggressive policy of General Jacob and Sir Henry 
Rawlinson. His name, too, had been prominently associated mith 
the deposition of the Guikwar. Re mas a new man on the 
Punjab frontier, having had no dealings q<th the Afghans, nor 
they with him. .The Amir had been informed that he vas the 
Special Envoy whom Lord Lytton had brought out mith him 
from England, and intended to send to Cabul, and whose mission 
the Amir had declined to receive. 
The previous measures of the Viceroy were cdculilted to 
darm Sher Ali, and it was very probable that he mould conned 
8ir Lewis Pelly in some way with these measures. Syed Noor 
Mahomed Shah had suggested the name of Colonel Pollock as 
Commissioner to meet him :-'' On account of our former i~ltirnncy 
they would be able, when they met, to talk over all matters 
frankly and fully together." Cir Henry Rawlinson calls Eyed 
Noor Mahomed the Amir's evil and says, "he was 
bitterly opposed to us." But this desire to meet an old friend is 
rather proof to the contrary. The conditions sought to be im- 
posed upon the Amir by Lord LyLytton mere, many of them, 
entirely inconsistent with Sher Ali's independence. The Viceroy 
certainly offered to become the jailer of Yakoob Khan, a Conces- 
sion, one imagine, scarcely in accordance with the dignity 
of Her &Jajesty9s Representative. Even such a concession was not 
likely to reconcile the Amir to proposds for the estabhhment of 
telegraphic communication through his dominions, to the indis- 
criminate admission of Englishmen, official and non-official, into 
Afghanistan, and to the location of British Agents in Herit, 
Balkh, and other Afghan cities. 
There were other solid advantages no doubt, if only f3hcr M i  
could be brought to appreciate them, and that he would (10 so in 
the end Lord Lytton, loolring at the matter from a purely English 
point of view, apparently believed, as he states in his telcgraxn of 
the 2nd August, 18'78 :-" We believe wo could correct situation, 
if allowed to treat as a question between us and the Amir, alJ. 
probably could do so without recourse to force." No opportunity, 
however, occurred of ascertaining whether the Amir would :LCC@ 
the conditions proposed by Lord Lytton, as the preliminary COII- 
dition on which Sir Lewis Pelly was directed to insist a sine 
pu6. non (viz., that of stationing British officers in Afghanistan) 
occupied the whole time of the Conference, until the death of 
Noor Mahomed Shah, which took place on the 26th March, 1877. 
It is impossible to read the proceedings of' the Conference, 
without perceiving that,'one single question was uppermost iu the 
mind of the dying Envoy, charged as he was to convey ihc 
sentiments of the Amir, and of the Afghan Chiefs and pcoplo. 
" Why all this pressing," he says, " to send British officers to 
Afghanistan, when you declare that you have no wish to ixlterfero 
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan P It has rouscd thc suspicion 
of the Amir, and his suspicion is confirmed by the arbitrary acts 
of your Government, and he is now convinced that t o  allow 
British officers to reside in his country will be to ro1inquis;lri his 
own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on tho 
Afghan people d l  be attached to his name, and he .Nil1 sooner 
perish than submit to this. The British nation is grcat 
powerfll, and the Afghan pcople cannot resist its power, but ttlc 
people are self-willed and independent, and prim th~.ir h(nlour 
above life." * What are Afghan honour and Afglrlan indcI,cndmloa 
to Lord Lytton? The distant and unreal dangcr of i~ 1tuwiirn 
advance on India overleaps such minor considerations. What arc 
villages burned, and homes destroyed, and women and e]lildrcn 
* "Afghanittan Payers," p. 195. 
starved, and misery and hatred and despair sown broadcast 
throughout the land, in comparison with ideal British interests 
and the scientific rectification of a frontier ? Yes, the British 
nation is great and powerful, as the dying Envoy said, with 
marked earnestness and grarity, and the Afghan people are 
weak, and Lord Lytton can break them as a reed, and trample 
them under foot as an earthen pipkin, if they venture to stand in 
t h e  way of his Imperial policy. But God resisteth the proud ; 
and this temper of mind, whether in individuals or in nations, 
makes to itself great reverses. 
f On the death of Syed Noor Mahomed, Lord 1,ytton lost 
no time in closing the Conference, although he was aware 
thai a fresh Envoy was on his way from Cabul, who, it was 
reported, had authority to accept all the conditions of the British 
Government. Instead of exercising forbearance, and seizing on 
every opening which afforded a prospect of bringing about a 
peaceful settlement, Lord Lytton seems on all occasions to have 
P' taken the exactly opposite course, and to have determined to cut 
the Gordian knot of di6culties with the sword. ' ~ t  this critical 
juncture, when it  was especially desirable that some representative 
of the British Government should be near Sher Bli, to take 
advantage of any propitious moment to sootlle his angry feelings, 
t o  allay his suspicions, and to place matters in as favourable a 
light as possible, not only with the Amir, but with the Chiefs 
about his Court, Lord Lytton withdrew the British Agent from 
Cab~il. I t  is difficult to imagine 'a more ill-advised step.' If 
Russian intrigues were dreaded, this was to act preoisel~ as they 
would wish, a id  to throw the game entirely into their hands. 
It deprived the h i r  of all moral support, removed every check, 
with a Chief of his moody and sullen disposition, sharpened 
his sense of wrong, and gave him additional grounds for appre- 
hension. I t  discouraged the well-wishers of the British Govern- 
ment, and left them without a rallying point to make head 
against the fanaticism of the anti-British party. They could not 
trust each other, but they could trust a British Agent of rank of 
their o m  creed, who would report favourably on their conduct, 
1 
and ensure them a reward. ' It was indeed a hostile measure, 
and calculated to provoke hostility. I t  had the further disad- 
vantage of leaving the British Government in ignorance of what 
was going on at Cabul. Intelligence from that quarter hence- 
forth only reached India through questionable and uncertain 
channels of communication. 
From March 1877 until July 1878 there appears to  have 
been no correspondence between the Viceroy and Sher Afi. 
Then came the news of the arrival of a Russian Mission at Cabul, 
"the true purpose of which," Sir Henry Rawlinson tells us, 
" was to confirm Sher AliJs hostility to England, and to provoke 
us to enter on an armed conflict with the Afghans, the benevolent 
aim of Russia being to lead us on to exhaust our strength in 
what she hoped would be an endless and profitless struggle at 
Cabul." This is mere conjecture ; we know little or nothing of 
the real relations between Sher Ali and the Russian Xission, one 
of the mischievous consequences of the withdrawal of the British 
Agent at Cabul. We know that the Russian Mission was 
detained a month on some pretext before it was permitted to 
proceed through Afghan territory. J The Amir declared he did 
not, in the first instance, invite it. Lord Northbrook says "that 
he tried to prevent its going ; " but he gave it permission to come 
on when he had no alternative. Its object, he said, was only to 
exchange civilities. " He had no desire to give Russia a right of 
way through his country." I t  was a source, no doubt, of embar- 
rassment to him, and led to the postponement of the British 
Mission, which it will be recollected he did not reject, but only 
postponed. If, however, it was the " benevolent aim " of Russia 
to involve us in war with the Afghans, she succeeded. One of 
Napoleon's maxims in war was "never to do what the enemy 
wished you to do, for this reason alone, that he desired it." 
Lord Lytton seems to have acted on the contrary principle. This 
Russian Mission of four or five Europeans, and a few Cossacks, 
which Lord Beaconsfield admits was quite allowable, ma which 
was withdrawn immediately on a representation being made at 
St. Petersburgh, fills Lord Lytton with alarm, and is the basis of 
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the  violent polby subsequently pnrsued towards the Amir. He 
despatches an urgent telegram, dated the 2nd of August, to the 
Secretary of State, announcing "his intention to insist on 
reception of suitable British Mission at Cabul, that he did not 
anticipate serious resistance, that to re-establish the preponderance 
of British idhence in Afghanistan was necessary for the safety of 
India," that influence apparently, in the Viceroy's opinion, being 
endangered by the temporary presence of a few Russian Officers 
at Cabul. If  such were the case the safety of India must indeed 
rest on a very sandy founclation. Lord Metcalfe certainly did 
say "that we were sitting on a barrel of gunpowder in India, and 
never knew when it  would explode ;" and again, that me should 
wake up some morning, and find that we had lost India." But 
Lord Metcalfe pointed to danger from within, and not from 
without. I n  reference to the present state of affairs, that eminent 
Statesman made another striking remark. " Depend upon it," he 
1 said, " the surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves, is for ! us to cross the Indus, and meddle with the countries beyond it." I Lord Lytton, ignoring alike the lessons of history and of past 
I 
experience, fixes his eyes on Russian machinations, and seems 
blind to other contingencies. It is decided by the Viceroy that 
Sir Neville Chamberlain shall be deputed to Cabul, as British 
Envoy, and Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan is directed to pro- 
I ceed in advance with a letter t o  the Amir. On the 17th of August, Abdulla Jan, the heir apparent, dies, and a delay occurs 
I before the Mission can commence its journey. Meantime Lord Lytton telegraphs to the Commissioner of Peshawur, to inform one I of the Amir's principal officers that the Mission will, in any case, leave Peshawur about the 16th of September ; that a refusal of 
free passage and safe conduot will be considered " an act of open 
hostility.'' Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan reached Cabul on the 
10th of September. He was well received on the journey, and 
hospitably entertained on arrival, On the 12th he had an inter- 
view with the Amir, and reported him t o  be very much displesed, 
and as saying, " It is as if they were come by force. I do not 
agree to the Mission coming in this manner. I t  is as if they 
E 
to disgrace me. I am a friend, as before, and entertain no ill 
will." If Mission advance now, c L  resistance anticipated." Again, 
" that the Amir intimated that he would send for the Mission to 
clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt 
to force the Mission upon him without his consent being first 
granted, according to usual custom, otherwise he would resist it, as 
coming in such a manner would be a slight to him."*' In a lat7er 
letter, dated Cabul, 15th September, Gholam Hussein states :-" If 
Mission starts on 18t11, without waiting for AmirJs permission, 
there would be no hope left for the renewal of friendship or recon- 
ciliation."t f On the 19th of September, Sir Neville Ohamberlain 
telegraphed to the Viceroy, that it  was now quite evident that the 
Amir was determined on asserting his claims to total independence 
of action with regard to the Mission; but that he held out the 
hope that hereafter he would receive it honourably. " Unless 
your Lordship accepts this position, all chance of a peaceful solu- 
tion seems to me gone."fr' Under instructions from the Viceroy, 
the Mission moved out of Peshawur to Jumrood on Che 21st of 
September, and Major Cavagnari was sent forward with a small 
escort in the direction of Ali Musjid, to demand a passage through 
the Ehyber from the commandant of the fort, Faiz Mahomed, 
who declared that) without orders from the Amir, he could not 
allow the Mission to his post, but who from. first to last," 
Major Cavagnari writes, behaved in a most courteous manner, 
and very favour ably impressed both Colonel Jenlrins and myself ." f 
Major Cavagnari aslts, '' Shall I make another attempt to - 
morrow morning, and try to bring Faiz M a h o ~ e d  to reason, or 
make him fire upon us ?" Sir Neville Charnberfkin docs not wish 
to push matters to this extremity, and returns to  Peshawur, and 
the Nission is dissolved. He writes in his report :-" The Mission 
had failed ; it had been turned back at the threshold of the Amirys 
dominions with an affront delivered before all the world." The 
affront was the more pointed) as two scions of the noble families 
of Tonk and Jeypore accompanied the Mission. But whose con- 
dud  led up to this affront ? Was it not that of Lord Lytton ? He 
knew well beforehand that the Mission would not be allowod to 
* p. 243. t 243. 5 p. 249. 
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1 to believe, also, that if he waited a short time that consent would 
i be obtained. 
1 
Eugene Sohuyler says justly, with reference to the KEokhan- 
dians, w h a t  applies equally to  the Afghans:-"Asiatics do not 
practise common sense, which would forbid them to begin a strug- 
' gle disproportionate to their means." With the overwhelming 
strengtll of British power we could have afforded to wait. I t  was 
as certain as anything could be that by hurrying matters we 
should bring on a conflict, and that that conflict would entail the 
shedding of blood-the blood of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
innocent persons, inhabiting the hills and valleys where their 
forefathers had dwelt for ages in heedom, owning allegiance 
neither t o  the Amfr, nor to the British Government, nor to any- 
one except to their own Chiefs. With our improved arms of pre- 
cision, our mountain guns, and formidable field artillery, our 
ahnost unlimited resources in men and money, there was no doubt 
that we could coerce these wild, undisciplined mountaineers. We 
1 could cai-ry fire and sword throughout their homes ; and if we 
chose, we could, as some have recommended, exterminate whole 
tribes. B u t  is such conduct worthy of a great Christian nation P 
Will it commend itself to the millions of Asiatics over whom we 
rule in Ind i a  ? Will i t  tend to allay the feelings of dislike and 
disaffection with which there is little reason to doubt, unfortu- 
nately, t h a t  the larger portion of our Mohammedan subjects regard 
British domination ? 
T h e r e  is a hJb service founded on fear, and there is a deeper 
service of  the heart based on justice, which all men in all 
countries can reverence and appreciate. Sir Henry Xawlinson 
arites :-"War with the Afghans is to be deprecated beyond all 
other wars, because, however it  may end, i t  mill leave behind it a 
heavy legacy of debt, and the hatred of a people who ought to 
be' our friends." Again :- '' Our old blood feuds with the 
Ghilzyes and Duranis wiU be revived and intensified, so that it ' 
1 will be next to impossible to restore that mutual confidence, 
I which could alone warrant our placing in the hands of the 
Afghans the permanent defence of our extreme Northern 
frontier." There are not only present evils, but the seeds of 
future evil sown, to bring forth a plentiful harvest of trouble 
hereafter. All this is done, according to the Viceroy's proclama- 
tion, in order that a the British Government may find the best 
security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State whose 
independence it seeks to confirm." I n  the same strain Sir 
Neville Chamberlain writes :-"The object of the Mission was to 
promote peace, and to bring about, if it was possible, a return to 
friendly and close relations with the Amir." 
Surely all this talk of peace and friendship is a strange 
perversion of language taken in connection with what was 
evidently to be the result of the course Lord Lytton was pur- 
suing. But to blame Lord Lytton is not to exculpate the Amir. 
Everyone can see that Sher Ali behaved like a madman, and 
hurried on to his own destruction. An individual may behave 
badly when a quarrel is forced upon him, but if he is not the 
aggressor, allowances are made for his conduct. I n  Sher Ali's 
case, we have on the one side Christianity and a boasted higher 
civilization, and on the other a half-civilized Ruler and a still 
less civilized aggregate of ignorant and fanatical tribes, and quasi 
independent Chiefs, on whose fitful support the Amir could place but 
little reliance. Bad there been no Russian Mission at Cabul," 
Sir Henry Rawlinson writes, "no indication of a desire on the 
part of the Turkestan authorities to interfere in Indian politics, 
we might have dowed the Amir to  be sulky and grumbling, and 
even insolent, for the term of his, natural life." 
Here we have stated in plain and direct terms the real grounds 
of our forward movement int:, Afghanistan. Sher ALi and the 
Afghan nation were powerless by themselves to cause any anxiety 
or alarm, unless backed by Russian troops and Russian resources. 
4 Now it may be asked with confidence whether it was in tho 
smallest degree probable that Russia, at the close of an exhausting 
v~.ar with a comparatively feeble antagonist, where her losses in 
men and officers had been so great, and her expenditure so heavy, 
would have been likely to provoke EL fresh contest with one of the 
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most powerful nations in the world: If the Russian Miflsion was 
prepant  w i th  disastrous consequences to India, as has been SO 
persistently affirmed, but which remains to be proved, we had 
only to demand its withdrawal, and Russia would have acquiesced, 
as in fact s h e  did acquiesce. We  could have then dealt with 
Sher fi at our leisure. Lord Lytton's course of action had no 
doubt ~omplicated the question, alarmed the Amir, and thrown 
obstacles in t h e  way of friendly negotiations. But with t he  dis- 
appearance of the Russian Mission the greatest difficulty would 
have been removed. Sher Ali declared that on the departure 
of the Russians he  would receive the British Mission, and he 
might have been persuaded to meet the Viceroy at Peshamr ,  or  
elsevhere, where  by an interchange of friendly courtesies, as at 
Umballa in 1869, a better state of feeling might have been 
brought about. But  to effect this, the obnoxious condition of 
stationing Bri t ish officers in Afghan territory must have been 
withdrawn. This, however, was a cardinal point in the policy of 
Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton to be forced on Sher Ali at all 
hazards, a n d  o n  the afghan people, who were more averse t o  t h i s  
measure than Sher Ali himself. We  find, at page 367 of M. 
Ferrier's " Caravan Journeys,". a narrative of the risk he ran at 
Candahar, though under the protection of Eohundil Khan, a 
brother of Dost Mahomed, then Ruler of that city. The  people 
were dying of cholera. One of the Ulemas declared that  "while 
Candahar was sullied by the presence of an infidel, the enemy of 
God and man, there would be no cessation of their afEction." 
M. Ferrier's house was besieged for three days ; Kohundil Khan 
himself was obliged to take refuge in the citadel until a rein- 
forcement of troops arrived and put an end to the insurrection. 
The same spirit of fanaticism still exercises unbounded sway 
over the large majority of the Afghan population, and though, 
under t h e  coercive influence of a British force, it may be quiescent 
for a time, any favourable opportunity would bring its dormant 
elements into dangerous activity. 
On the dissolution of Sir N e d e  Chamberlain's Mission, Lord 
Lytton directed the assemblage of troops, with a view to  early 
ulterior operations. Shortly afterwards the answer of the Amir, 
dated 6th October, to the Viceroy's letter, conveyed by Nawab 
Gholam Husseia, was received. This answer of Sher Ali was 
couched in a tone of indignant remonstrance, complaining of 
letters transmitted to the Cabul Officials by the Commissioner of 
Peshawur, ancl of the harsh and breathless haste of the pro- 
ceedings of Lord Lytton, but i t  was neither defiant nor insulting. 
The Viceroy, however, considered it  as conveying a direct chal- 
lenge, and would have immecliately commenced hostilities. 
I Lord Canning's reluctance to enter upon warlike operations 
against Persia forms a marked contrast to Lord Lytton's precipi- 
tancy in hurrying on a collision with the Amir. Lord Canning a 
writes to Mr. Ternon Smith, April 22nd, 1856 Do not be 
afraid of my being unduly hasty to punish Persia. Unless the 
Shah should steam up the Hooghly with Murray swinging at his 
yard arm, I hope that we shall be able to keep the peace until 
your instructions arrive." Lord Lytton sent a telegram to the 
Secretary of State counselling instant action, but her Majesty's 
Government very properly determined to make another effort to 
avert the calamities of war, and the Viceroy was directed, before 
crossing the frontier into Afghanistan, to demand an apology from 
Sher ALi in temperate language. Unfortunately the Ultimatum 
was not drawn up in a conciliatory tone, the acceptance of a 
permanent British Mission wae still insisted upon, and a very few 
days were allowed for t h e - ~ m i r  to make up his mind. $her fi 
returned no answer to the Ultimatum w i t h  the appointed time, 
the 20th of November, and on the 21st of that month the 
Viceroy issued his Proclamation of war.' On the same day the 
British troops advanced and, as was to be expected, complete success 
crowned their operations. I n  spite of advantages of position, and 
the great natural obstacles of the country, the Afghan undisci- 
plined tribes have always succumbed easily to the valour and 
discipline of a British force when well handled, and have never 
made any determined resistance like the Goorkahs or Sikhs, or 
even the Rajpoot and Mahratta armies. Many of the Afghans 
are individually brave, but they have no cohesion, no trust in 
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I their leaders, who possess little military capacity. Each afghan 
contemptible enemies when they have been met in the open plains. 
i The Cabul catastrophe casts a dark shadow over past cam- 
i 
1 paigns in Afghanistan; our constant easy victories during years 
of warfare faded out of sight, and Afghan prowess was much 
exaggerated. Sir William Nott wrote :-" The Army at Candahar 
has defeated the enemy in some sixteen actions, tranquillized the 
whole country, made every Afghan bend the knee, never met with 
a reverse, however outnumbered by the enemy."* It must be 
recollected also, in Sir Wm. Nott's days, the range of the British 
musket in the hands of the Sepoy was inferior to that of the 
Afghan weapon (the Jezail). I t  is a very different matter at the 
present time, when the superiority of our arms of precision gives 
us an immense advantage. 
Any danger from an invasion of India by Afghans, which 
has been held up by some as a reason for an advance of frontier, 
may be dismissed as undeserving of serious consideration. Sir 
Henry Rawlinson tells us that " Aryans, Greeks and Bcythianfi, 
Turks, Persians and Afghans, have, at different periods of history, 
to arrest the progress of the invader before he crossed the Indus." 
Sir Henry does not add, what is an important element in the cal- 
culation, that invaders of the present day would have to meet a 
very ddTerent enemy to those of former periods of history-a 
well-disciplined, well-equipped British army, comp~sed of as fine 
troops as any in the world, and furnished with the latest arms of 
precision, and any amount of artillery and munitions of war. 
These troops, led by officers of the highest professional skill and 
capacity, acting under a strong united Government, abounding in 
all the resources that vast wealth can provide, in complete con- 
trast to  the Governments that existed at the time of successful 
invasions of India, which were, without exception, weak, corrupt, 
and divided amongst themselves, with traitors in their camps and 
Councils, who looked more to their own interests than to the defence 
In 1868, Sir Henry Rawlillson drew " an alarming picture of 
50,000 Persian Sirbaz, supported by a Russian column, and 
hinted that it might be successful, owing to the prevalent dis- 
affection of the Mohammedan population of India." I n  like 
manner, q~tite recently, he brings to notice the rumoured project of 
the Russian Minister of War to transfer bodily across the Gaspian 
to Asterabnd the army of the Caucasus for an attack on HerAt; 
but in subseque~lt paragraphs he demolishes this scheme, " as all 
the Volga steamers would be quite insufficient to move 70,000 
men," and, " without the co-operation of Persia, which could not 
be relied an, neither carriage nor provisions could be obtained for 
the march through Khosasan." If these important elements for 
the success of an invading army mould not be available in 
Bhorasan, the want of them would be likely to to be still more 
felt in Afghanistan, where, as Sir Henry Lawrence wrote in 
1856, " a  large army would be starved in a week." In  
reference to Sir Richard Temple's statement of Nohammedan 
disaffection in India, Sir Henry Rawlinson characterizes the 
1angu;lge used as " alarmist in tone, and exaggerated in sub- 
shnce." Many persons will be inclined to  think that the threat- 
ened danger of 50,000 Persian Sirbaz in 1868, and of 70,000 
Russians iu 1878, may well be classed in the same category. 
The immeasurable superiority of the power of the British Empire, 
compared with the petty disorganized kingdom of Cabul, is beyond 
dispute. When the season permits of a renewal of warlike opera- 
tions, if the Afghans have not previously submitted, at more or 
less cost of life and money, according to circumstances, it is clear 
that we can oveimn, and, if we choose, subjugate the country. 
But, as the Duke of Wellington said in reference to the cam- 
paign of 1839, (( our (lifficulties mill commence where our military 
successes end." The important question then arises, What  do we 
intend to do ? Has the Government any fixed policy, or is i t  
dlifting along, the creature of circumstances, to find itself, at no 
very distant period, saddled with responsibilities political and 
financial, which, at the outset, never entered into its calculation, 
and which may prove disastrous to the welfare and p rosp i t y  of 
our Indian Empire ? I 
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raise up a barrier a[ 
our h d i a n  Empire ? Lord Wellesley always spoke contemptu- 
ously of the folly of occupying a land of c c  rocks, sands, deserts, 
ice, and snow." I s  this what Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Lytton 
have in contemplation ? Lord Lytton states in his isPoclamation 
that "with the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Govern- 
m e n t  has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved 
from all responsibility from the recent acts of the Amir, and as 
they have given no offence, so the British Government, w i 6 h g  
t o  respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere 
with them." General Roberts's announcement that the districts 
occupied by his troops are hsnceforth to be considered British 
territory is scarcely in accordance with the Proclamation of the 
Viceroy; but how far this apparent pledge of annexation commits 
the Government remains to be seen. Sher Ali has fled from 
Cabul,  whether, like Dost Mahomed, to appear again upon the 
scene, time will show. Lord Northbrook's Government tells us 
in their despatch of 28th January, 1876, " there can be no ques- 
tion that the power of Amir Sher Ali Khan has been consolidated 
throughout Afghanistan in a manner unknown since the days of 
D o s t  Mahomed. Nowhere has intrigue or rebellion been able to 
m a k e  head in the Amir's dominions." 
I t  was foreseen by those acquainted with Afghan politics that 
our advance into Afghanistan would shatter the Government. Our 
object was t o  have a strong and f'riendly Btateriupon our North- 
Western frontier. The first result of our present policy is to veaken 
and disintegrate the cohesion, which, for the last ten years, had been 
assuming a more permanent form, and to let lobse the elements of 
disorder, which have so generally prevailed in Afghanistan. Besides 
breaking up their Government, we have made the Afghans our 
enemies. As long as they believed that we had no intention of 
annexing any territory beyond the passes, they would have felt more 
fear of Russia than of ourselves. Our advance to Quettah alarmed 
them, and our present proceedings will have confirmed them in the 
view that it is our determination eventually to occupy their country. 
This is not a good foundation for a safe frontier. We desire to 
raise up a barrier against Russian intrigues. There could not have 
been a better barrier than afghan jealousy of interference and 
love of independence : all those feelings are now enlisted against 
us, and on the side of Russia. W e  may build fortlresses at great 
cost, but unless we hold the country in strength, with a hostile 
population, our posts would be always in danger, and useless for 
the purpose for which we profess to advance them. And to what 
point are we to advance ? A recent writer iq. the Quarterly Review, 
evidently master of the subject, sketches out what we may have 
to do :-"It might be necessary to take up strong and command- 
i ng  positions in front at N p e n e h ,  at Bamian, and on the river 
of Badakshan, so as to overawe Turkestan, and compel the Rus- 
sians to act on the defensive rather than the offensive." 
If wecontemplate the relative distances of Mymeneh, Bamian, 
and the river of Badakshan, how far removed they all are from 
o w  base, how great the diiliculties must be of obtaining sup- 
plies, how vast the expense of maintaining garrisons in these 
remote provinces, and, after all, how inadequate such precautions 
must prove to overawe Turkestan, the British Government may 
well pawe before it embarks upon such a crusade. Moreover, 
should these advanced posts be really threatened by Russia, rein- 
forcements must be hurried up at all hazards, stores of all kinds, 
especially mwoitions of war, must be transported at enormous cost. 
Major Wood states that every round shot brought to Central Asia 
by the Russians is computed to have cost nearly two pounds ster- 
ling in transport. The difficulties of obtaining carriage and sup- 
plies for the convoys, regular communication with the rear being 
certain to be interrupted, would be almost insurmountable. 
Those who are opposed to the present advance into afghanis- 
tan do not believe in the wisdom of a policy that would seek to 
overawe Turkestan. They do not consider that Russia has either 
the power or the resources to undertake so gigantic an enterprise 
as a hostile invasion of I d a .  Her hold on Central h i a  requires 
consolidation. She has overrun rapidly a vast extent of territory 
sparsely inhabited, the inhabitants being chiefly nomad hordes 
-poor, faaatical, as likely as not to break out into insurrection 
should a favourable opportunity occur. India doee not afford us 
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as secure a 'base of military operations as we could wish, 't it is 
much more secure than Turkestan to the Russians ; and all the 
resources of the British Empire ark nearer and more easily avail- 
able on the ba,nks of the Indus than the resources of Russia on 
the banks of the Oxus. Mr. Sohuyler tells us L L  that the revenues 
of Central Asia are insufficient to meet the expenses of adminis- 
tration, more and more taxes are demanded, and since the 
occupation of the country by the Bussians, the condition of the 
population has not only not grown better, but on the contrary is 
every day getting worse and worse." 
We may put aside any prospect of present danger from Russia, 
but  it is said me must provide for the future. We must convert a 
haphazard into a scientific frontier. Until lately this so-called 
haphazard frontier was considered the best adapted for our security 
by the highest military authorities. At the present moment, it is 
believed that  the preponderance of military authority is against 
an advance of frontier, even on purely strategical grounds. Ad- 
mitting, however, that there may be a question on this point, as 
therc are doubtless names of great weight on either side, there 
can be no question of the political and financial disadvantages 
tha t  must result from a further extension of our 'Indian territories. 
These disadvantages, will, of course, prove of greater or less mag- 
nitude, according to the final arrangements made by Her ~ a j e s t ~ ' s  
Government for the settlement of Afghmistan. If w e  .are 
burden she is ill fitted to support. If, on the contrary, the easy 
success which has hitherto attended our arms becomes a 
snare and a delusion to lead us on to the permanent 
occupation of Afghan territory, and to direct intervention in 
the fathomless gulf of Afghan politics, the wisest Statesman 
may be at fault in rightly estimating future difficulties. 
Prominent among these difficulties is the establishment of 
satisfaotory relations with the independent Afghan tribes 
inhabiting the mountain ranges between our present border, 
and the country owing allegiance to the Amir of Afghesistan. 
These tribes have enjoyed their independence for hundreds of 
years ; strong in their mountain fastnesses, inured to arms from 
their youth upwards, their hand against every man, and every 
man's hand against them, they cling with tenacity to their 
republican institutions, and have never bowed their necks to any 
settled government. They were a, thorn in the side of the Mogul 
Emperors, and on several occasions inflicted eevere defeats on 
armies sent against them. 
I n  a night attack, for which the Afghans have alwaya been 
famous, the Eusofzyes killed Bir Bal, one of Akber's favourite 
Generals, and destroyed many thousands of his troops. Mr. 
Elphinstone writes :- " They were never more formidable than in I 
the reign of Aurungzebe ; they resisted repeated attacks from the 1 
Kings of Persia and Cabul, and retain their turbulent independence 
undiminished to the present day." When Ruujeet Sing pushed 
his dominions beyond the Indus, these tribes carried on an inter- 
necine war with the Sikhs, who vainly strove to coerce them, by 
building forts, and punishing them with Draconian severity. 
General Avitabile, Governor of Peshawur, dared not leaye his 
capital, except accompanied by a large force. On the annexation 
of the Punj ab the country afflicted with this chronic state of dis- 
order passed under our rule, and ever since i t  has been the endea- 
vour of the British Government to place our relations with these 1 
border tribes on a better footing. Progress in this work of concilia- 
tion and improvement has been necessarily slow ; the habits of 
centuries are not overcome in a few years, and the administrative I 
exigencies of a vast Empire are so various and extensive that i ! 
attention could not be concentrated on one corner of our territories, 1 
so as to produce very rapid effects. But all acquainted with the , 
subject will admit that very tangible results had been produced, 
the chief difficulties had been overcome, and greater results would i 
have followed. Now, however, we are to commence afresh on a f 
new course of action, we are to take all the passes into our own j 
1 hands, and keep down by force of arms tens of thousands of those 
warlike and independent mountaineers. With this object we are 
to  place isolated posts in exposed positions, where they will have 
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enough. to do to take care of themselves, and will exercise little 
no influence over the mountain fastnesses on every side of them, 
from whence the predatory tribes will have the opportunity of 
issuing forth to plunder convoys which must be continually passing 
to and fro to supply the garrisons. 
While these tribes were in front of us, we could always meet 
them at an advantage, when they ventured into the pla+s. We 
generally had timely notice of their approach, and could collect a 
sdc i en t  force to preclude the chance of any untoward accident ; 
but with an immensely extended area of operations, i t  will be 
more d.ifficult to use the same precautions, and to provide against 
all contingencies. Although they owned no allegiance to  the 
Amir of Cabul, and set his authority at defiance whenever i t  
suited their purpose, plundering the baggage of Dost Mahomed 
and Sher Ali, as they plundered the property of every one who 
trespassed on their confines whenever they saw an opening, still 
the rulers of Afghanistan had a .certain amount of influence, 
which when exerted in favour of peace and order was not 
without its value. In  rendering the Afghans hostile to us we 
add another disturbing element to the task of conciliating the 
tribes and pacifying the frontier, and also another element of 
discontent with our rule, which may prove contagious at a 
moment when we are least prepared with means of repression. 
r 1 l h e  native army, reorganized since the mutiny, contains within 
its ranks a larger proportion of Mohammedan soldiers, many of 
them enlisted from the tribes on the frontier. When stationed 
amongst their own native hills, and employed. to coerce their own 
countrymen, the loyalty of these troops will be put to a test to 
which in its full extent it has not hitherto been subjected, and 
which is not without danger. Twenty years ago we passed 
through a tremendous ordeal, and through God's mercy emerged \ 
from it triumphantly. What has happened may happen again, I f  
at that period large bodies of our troops had been stationed in 
forts and garrisons far distant beyond the passes in Afghanistan, 
i t  may be left to any reasonable person to determine whether our 
diiliculties woula not have been greatly increased. 
While there is danger in this respect, on the other hand service 
in Afghanistan will always be unpopular with natives of Hindostan 
of all castes and classes. The Sikhs and Goorkhas will view with 
inveterate dislike any prolonged residence at such a distance from 
their homes, which involves separation from their wives and 
families, in an uncongenial climate where all the necessaries of 
life are so expensive. The Goorlchas are especially sensitive in 
regard to separation fiom their families. If the service in 
Afghanistan is distasteful to native troops, much more so must it 
prove to the numerous class of camp followers so essential in 
India to the well-being and efficiency of an army in the field. 
The sufferings of these poor creatures in our last advance to Cabul 
and in the disastrous retreat were dre.~dful, and if rumour speaks 
truly, the heaviest burden has also fallen upon them in the present 
campaign. 
A11 these causes of future embarrassment and difficulty 
connected with an advaiice of frontier are overlooked by 
many persons who have neither the time nor the opportunity 
to study this important question. In the lapse of years 
the lessons of the former war in Afghanistan have been 
forgotten by the people of lingland, but its baneful effects have 
left a deep impression on the minds of the people of 
India. This impression is not likely to ba effaced, or to conduce 
to their contentment, when, according to the decision of Her 
Majesty's Government, they are called upon to pay additional 
taxes in order to defray the expenses of the present war. At the 
time Lord Canning was leaving India, Raja Dinlrur RRO wrote a 
memorandum for him, full of suggestive remarks, from a native 
point of view, as to the policy the British Government should 
pursue towards its native subjects. He says :-" To every Govern- 
ment the foundations of security are twofold-lst, the strength of 
the army ; %nd, the contentment of its subjects. Both these are 
essential. Then after enumerating the benefits conferred upon 
India by British rule, he writes :-" While all these tliings tire 
before the subjects in favour of a Government which does so 
much for their comfort, they are still greatly dissatisfied with the 
severity of some of the regulations which are against their 
customs, and with various kinds of stamp duties and taxes, almost 
all classes are very much bewildered from being harassed in all 
the ordinary occupations of their lives. By this means the people 
have forgotten the goodness of the British Government, the love 
which they once entertained for it, and have begun to prefer the 
tyranny of Native Princes." He  goes on to complain of the 
income tax, the license tax, and the heavier salt tax, as especially 
obnoxious to the people, and adding to causes of former discontent. 
All those acquainted with India are aware that increased taxation 
becomb more and more dangerous to the tranquillity of the 
country. Several of the distinguished Statesmen who have filled 
the high office of Viceroy have brought this subject, of late years, 
to the notice of the Home Authorities in forcible language. Owing 
t o  the recurrence of famines, the depreciation of silver, the general 
depression of trade, and other causes, India, at thee present 
moment, is less able than ever to support additiollal financial bur- 
dens, and the cost of an unnecessary war is not likely to rendcr 
them more palatable to native opinion. What would entail a very 
light pressure on England might prove of serious moment in India. 
Lord Salisbury has himself stated:--"The difference between 
England and India in matters of finance is this, that in Zngland 
you can raise a large increase of taxation without in the least 
degree e dangering our institutions, whereas you cannot do so in 
India." 'According to a statement in Parliament by the Under 
Secretary of State for India, based upon a calculation made by the 
Indian Government as to what the war was likely to cost, the 
expenditure to be incurred within the present financial year, which 
closes on the 31st of March, 1879, was put d o m  at $950,000. 
And as there is an estimated surplus of ~1,550,000, the Secretary 
of State adds :--"It inust be perfectly obvious that the Indian 
Government could pay the whole cost of the war during the pre- 
sent year without adding a shilling to the taxation or the debt of 
I .  I 1  
thecountry."l *,!'.&' ' P 
It may be observed'that the gist ok the matter is not what may 
bo actually expended from the ~ r e a s u r ~  on the war up to the 31st 
of Narch, but what will be the whole expenditure by the time the 
war is brought to a conclusion. It is to be hoped that the san- 
guine expectations of the Government may be realized, but those 
who recollect the expenditure incurred in the last war in Afghan- 
istan may be permitted to express a doubt upon this vital poini. 
From the published Parliamentary papers, i t  appeared there 
were ten millions of accumulated surplus in the various treasuries 
of India, when the war in 1839 began. Not only was this entirely 
expended by the end of the year 1841, but a loan of five millions 
bad to be raised at an unusually high rate of interest. Sir Robert 
Peel stated in Parliament, on the 23rd June, 1842, that there had 
been a surplus revenue, just before the commencement of the war, 
of a million and a half, which, in 1840-41, was converted into a 
deficit of $2,324,000. I n  his letter to Lord Aberdeen, of Sep- 
tember 1841, Sir Henry Willock stated that so severely were the 
finances of Calcutta pressed, that a stoppage of payment at Fort 
William was at one time contemplated by the Supreme Council. 
On the 6th April, 1842, the Court of Directors brought to 
the notice of the President of the Board of Control, that the 
Government of India had intimated their intention " to discon- 
tinue their remittances for the supply of the Home Treasury, by 
means of advances upon goods hypothecated to the Court. The 
Local Government have been compelled to adopt this course by 
their financial difficulties, whicll have been wholly caused by the 
expensive operations in which they have been engaged beyond the 
Indus." 
The total military expenditure of India, during the five years 
ending with 1837-38, amounted to a little more than thirty-eight 
millions sterling; in the following five years it exceeded forty- 
eight millions. It was affirmed, on good authority, tliat nearly a 
million sterling aas  expended on camels alone-70,000 of these 
animals were reported to have perished during the campaign. 
The loss of horses also waa very p a t .  Major Eough statcs that 
in one day it  was requi~ite to  shoot fifty-three horses. Want ol 
forage for the cattlc, and want of provisions for thc troops and 
followers, ch~ rac tdzcd  the former advancc into Afgl~anistan. It 
is well lraown that in many parts of tho country the population 
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itself is constantly in a state of semi-starvation. There is no 
reason to believe that the productiveness of Afghanistan has 
increased of late years, but, on the contrary, that it has diminished. 
What must, therefore, be the difficulty and expense of procuring 
supplies for men and cattle during a long campaign? British 
energy, and a lavish expencliture of money mill, no doubt, over- 
come these difficulties; but all this mill contribute to swell the cost 
of the war, and lead to further embarrassments. 
Sir James Outram writes, in his rough notes, on 29th April, 
1839 :-" The army is in great distress for want of yrovisions, six 
days' supplies only remain in the Commissariat stores, and 
the merchants of Oandahar, who profess t o  have nothing in 
reserve, retail wheat flour in small quantities, at the rate of two 
seers (4 lbs.) the rupee, everything else being proportionately dear." 
Again :-" Provisions are daily becoming scarcer, and more dear, 
and flour has actually attained the exorbitant rate of a single seer 
for the rupee, a price which is, of course, quite beyond the 
means of our impoverished follomers. No grain has as yet been 
obtained for the horses." " The effects of the unwholesome food 
mhich the wretched followers have been obliged to consume, is 
everywhere painfully manifest." 
He had previously Faitten :--"The followers of the army 
were compelled to elie out their subsistence by picking up 
weeds." Subsequently the followers received their rations from 
the  Commissariat in the same manner.as the native troops, a very 
merciful measure; but the enormous expense entailed upon the 
Government by such a concession, with provisions at famine prices, 
may well be imagined. The effect of the exorbitant price of food 
of all descriptions, and the consequent increased scarcity, must 
have been to inflict great hardship and suffering on the poorer 
classes of the population of the country, and on classes with fixed 
stipends; and Sir William Macnaghten states that this mas one of 
the causes of British unpopularity. In the present campaign it 
is believed that the native troops who have crossed the frontier 
receive rations from the Commissariat, as in the previous war. 
When it  is>;recollected that the number of troops in the three 
F 
armies now employed exceeds those sent forward on the former 
invasion of Afghanistan, some idea may be formed of the expendi- 
ture lilcely to be incurred. I n  order to reduce this expenditure to 
the lowest point, Lord Lytton has not shrunk from the risk of 
denuding India of its garrisons, resorting to the questionable 
expedient of being indebted to Native Princes for contingents of 
troops to fill their places. Lord Dalhousie, in his minute of 28th 
February, 11856, observed :--"No prudent man who has any know- 
ledge of Eastern affairs, would ever venture to predict the main- 
tenance of continued peace within our Eastern possessions. 
Experience-frequent, hard, and recent experience-has taught us 
that war from without, or rebellion from within, may at any time 
be raised against us, in quarters where they were the least to be 
expected, and by the most feeblc and unlikely instruments.'' 
As far as can be ascertained, me have now seventeen regiments 
of British cavalry and infantry, and thirty-eight regiments of 
native cavalry and infantry, and about twenty-five batteries of 
artillery employed in Afghanistan, or on the very confines of our 
North-West 'ontier, in support of the troops in advance. I n  order 
to replace this large portion of the garrison of India, two 
regiments of British infantry, which were to have come homo, 
have been detained, and fifteen thousand recruits have been added 
to the native army. If trouble ~hould arise in the interior, or at 
the other extremity of our dominions, the Government might find 
itself' in a dilemma to provide troops to meet the emergem!-. By 
the proposed advance of frontier, we muItiply greatly the chances 
of collision both from within and from without, and impose upon 
India the absolute necessity of paying for a larger proportion of 
European troops, as any fmce stationed in Afghanistan must be 
chiefly composed of British regiments. On a very moderate 
estimate, even the occupation of posts above the passes would 
entail an additional burden on the revenues of India of more 
than ,z million sterling n year ; and, in the event of a further 
advance, which would most probably occur, enhanced expendi- 
ture would of course follow. The want of mean? has been the 
real reason why important works connected with the strengthen- 
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ing of our North-Western frontier, which have been for a series of 
years recommended by the highest military authorities, have not 
been executed. The completion of our railway communication to 
Peshawur, the construction of bridges across the Indus, the 
erection of fortitications in suitable positions, have all been con- 
stantly before the Government, and only delayed from financial 
considerations. These works relate only to the frontier ; but how 
many undertakings of the highest utility throughout India are 
obliged to be indefinitely postponed from the same cause? Already, 
at the very outset of the present war, the local Governments have 
been compelled to issue resolutions suspending the execution of 
all public works and grants of money until the state of the 
finances will permit of sanction being accorded. - 
To use the words of Lord Sandh~~rst, " it cannot be too often 
repeated that the occupation of Afghanistan, on account of the 
financial difficulty, is the stoppage of progress in India." Her 
Majesty's Government, it is but fair to conclude, h a ~ e  an equal 
interest with previous Go~ernments in the welfare and prosperity 
of India, and in undertaking the grave responsibility of an advance 
into Afghanistan, they must believe that such a step is impera- 
tively necessary for the safety of our Xastern dominions. But they 
cannot be blind to the impoverished state of India, nor to the 
political risks to  be incurred by any attempt to impose additional . 
taxation. They must therefore desire, as much as the strongest 
opponents of their present policy, to reduce to a minimum the 
burden about to be thrown on the Indian finances. It is clear 
that, however costly the expenditure incurred in the advance into 
Afghanistan, the permanent occupation of the country wiU entail 
a far heavier pressure upon the revenues of India ; those revenues, 
according to Sir John Strachey, possessing "no true surplus over 
expenditure to cover the many contingencies to which a great 
country is exposed." What, then, is the course t o  be pursued ? 
What is the solution of the present difEcult conjuncture of affairs, 
which is likely to be attended with the fewest political responsi- 
bilities, and the smallest probable future expenditure ? 
It must be admitted that the di5culties to be surmounted are 
very great, and depend to a certain extent upon contingencies not 
to be foreseen. The beginning of strife is as when one letteth 
out water, the end is often beyond our own control. The first 
thing to be achieved is to bring the war to an honourable con- 
clusion. The brilliant success that has attended the operations 
already undertaken bear ample witness to the gallantry and 
endurance of our troops, and to the promptitude, skill, and judg- 
ment of the generals in command. Whatever our armies may he 
called upon to perform, it is quite certain they will do their duty 
with the same valour and efficiency which they have always 
shown in all previous campaigns in every quarter of the globe. 
Peace, therefore, will be secured, either by an early submission of 
the Afghan leaders, or, after a short delay, as soon as the season 
permits of warlike movements. Hostilities being ended, and our 
power vindicated, the grand feature of our policy should be 
moderation in our demands. 
Lord Lytton has proclaimed to the world that "with the 
Sirdars and people of Afghanistan the British Government has 
no quarrel, and desires none; " and that "it will respect their 
independence." Let us act up to this declaration by insisting 
upon nothing that will wound the national feeling, and thus tend 
to keep alive a spirit of bitterness, and sow the seeds of future 
dissension. Meanwhile, now is the time to place our relations 
with Russia, in regard to these countries, upon a permanent and 
definite footing. We have hitherto never gone to the root of this 
great question with Russia, we have dealt with things on the 
surface in a vague undecided manner. Mr. Schuyler, who, it 
may be observed, is perhaps not wholly impartial, but whose 
opinion nevertheless carries weight, writes :-"The attitude of 
England towards Russia, with regard to Central Asia, can hardly 
be called a dignified one. There are constant questions, protests, 
demands for explanation, and even threats, at least in the 
newspapers, but nothing is ever done." Subsequently to the 
understanding entered into at the period of Mr. GladstoneYs 
administration, ltussia certainly endeavoured to fasten upon 
England the responsibility of controlling Sher Ali, but this was 
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repudiated by Mr. Gladstone i n  his  important speech of 
2Srd April, 1873. ltussia then let it be understood that, if 
England had preserved her freedom of action, Russia had done 
the same. Agab, Mr. Schuyler writes, evidently speaking from 
a Russian point of view : -" unless some new arrangement 
should be made, Russia has a perfect right, i n  case of troubles on 
the Oxus, to cross it and inflict punishment on t ~ e  troops and 
provinces of Sher Ali." A new arrallgement should undoubtedly 
be  made between the two Governments, not a mere understanding, 
but a binding engagement. I n  order, however, that negotiations 
should. have the best prospect of a happy termination, England 
should bear in mind the advice of a friendly French Minister 
(quoted by Sir Charles Dilke in a recent speech):-" I t  is of the 
most essential importance that the English Government should 
avoid, both in attitude and in language, everything in the least 
like arrogance." We should approach the discussion of this 
important question in no spirit of dictation nor of jealous rivalry, 
but on the footing of the perfect equality which belongs to  inyo 
of the greatest nations in the world. W e  require nothing more 
&om Russia than that she should enter into permanent and 
definite engagements, in accordance with her former assurances, 
with regard to Afghanistan, we on our part binding ourselves 
to respect the integrity and independence of the Afghan kingdom, 
and to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Central 
Asia beyond the Oxus. We  should also undertake to exercise 
our iofiuence to  prevent the Ruler of Afghanistan from giving 
offence to Russia, or embroiling himself with his neighbours, and 
we should seek no commercial advantages to the prejudice of 
Russia. It is so much to the interest of both co1.1atries that such 
an engagement should exist that it is difficult to imagine that 
any serious obstacle could arise to prevent its conclusion. 
We proceed, then, to deal with ~ f ~ h a n i s t a n -  Weighty 
arguments have been put forward by the highest 
authorities against any advance of frontier in that 
General Sir Henry Norman, himself a high authority, writes in a 
recent number of the Fortnightly Review :-" While many o ~ ~ ~ i ~ m  
have been given as to the folly of advancing our frontier, it 
seems an undoubted fact that no opposite opinion ever was 
expressed by any of the able Governors-General who have held 
sway in India up to the arrival of Lord Lytton, by any Com- 
mander-in-Chief in India, by any Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Punjab, the o5cer through whom, until 1876, all Cabul affairs 
used to be transacted, or by any member of the Supreme Council, 
before which all important questions affecting the Indian Empire 
come. 'Many officers in these positions have left on record the 
strongest possible objections to a forward movement except as an 
operation of war." In  reference t o  the occupation of any post 
beyond the Ehyber, General Hamley writes :--" There is much 
to be said against it, nothing for it. I t  would be a source not of 
strength but of wealmess." He then goes on to say on the 
question of meeting danger from invasion :-" I should feel con- 
fident of the result even in the Valley of the Indus, I think our 
position vastly improved by the occupation of Quettah, but I 
should think it all we could desire if we occupied Candahar." 
There is no doubt that Candahar, converted into a strong fortress, 
and held by an adequate garrison of British troops, would prove 
a formidable obstacle to an invading army. Its situation in the 
most fertile portion of Afghanistan, commanding the three roads 
to India, offers great advantages in a purely military point of 
view. But cogent political and financial reasons forbid the 
extension of our frontier, and enjoin the preservation, if possible, 
of an independent Afghan Kingdom intermediately between our 
own boundary and that of the Russian possessions in Central 
Asia. It is a subject of regret that we advanced t o  Quettah, 
more particularly without the consent of the Amir, who, i f  
properly approached in the first instance might have acceded to 
our wishes ; but having done so, and having, under treaty with the 
Khan of Ehelat, an undeniable right to locate troops in his 
territories, it may not be advisable that we should withdraw from 
a position of strategical importance, both with reference to the 
control of the Afghans and Belooches and to ulterior contingen- 
cies. Whether the town of Quettah itself in respect to  salubrity 
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and other considerations fulfils all the conditions needed to render 
i t  the most eligible position we could occupy can only be deter- 
mined by competent professional advisers on the spot. If not, 
there could doubtless be found in its vicinity some other locality 
where a large entrenched camp could be formed, which, held in 
strength, would secure all the required objects defensive and 
offensive. Our first duty should be to complete the communica- 
tions with our base, including the railroad to Dadur, and a bridge 
across the Indus at  Sukkur, with posts in support of adequate 
strength along the line to the rear. 
~ h e s e  works, essential on military grounds, would be highly 
beneficial also commercially. Our domination of the Bolan and 
the other passes near at hand, and our necessarily more intimate 
connection with the countries beyond, by rendering traffic more 
secure, and by guaranteeing freedom from vexatious imposts and 
restrictions, would give a great impulse to trade. Amongst 
the measures to be taken on the cessation of hostilities, and the 
renewal of relations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, there should 
be an arrangement for placing British commercial interests on a 
proper footing, and for protecting them against any hostile tariffs 
or immoderate transit duties. In the absence of official infor- 
mation it is difficult to determine how far the Government is 
committed to annexation by the reported announcement of Gencrd 
Roberts that the inhabitants of the Khost and Ehurum Valleys 
were henceforward to consider themselces British subjects. These 
raids upon outlying districts of the Amir's kingdom, which have 
been the cause of an immense amount of human suffering, 
without exercising any perceptible influence on the main purpose of 
the war, are to be lamented. The annexation of this territory, 
which is not likely to produce sufficient revenue to pay the cost of 
administration, and is certain to require additional troops to  protect 
that portion of the population which is peacefully disposed, mould 
prove a source of future trouble and increased expen&ture. It 
would be well that the British garrisons should be mithdram 
mthin the border-line of British tcrritorg. on the riglrt 
bank of the Indus. I n  fact, me should eschew all annexation of 
Afghan territory. Our object should be to conclude a treaty with 
whatever Ruler the Afghan nation may select, without interference 
with the integrity of their dominions or with their independence. 
We should beware of setting up a nominee of our own, but leave 
the choice to the Afghans themselves. In  order to afford them a 
convincing proof of our desire to maintain their independence, we 
should make the concession to their prejudices of withdrawing 
our demand for the residence of British Officers at Cabul, and in 
other Afghan cities. W e  should be content with a Mohammedan 
Envoy of rank and influence at Cabul. His salary should be 
increased and his establishment placed on a much more liberal 
scale than has hitherto been the practice. Selected Native Agents 
of intelligence might also be stationed at Her&$ Balkh, or in any 
other Afghan towns which might appear desirable. 
/' J' It was a cardinal maxim of the policy of the Nepaul Govern- 
ment for many years to keep the secrets of their own fastnesses 
unspied into by us, and a great jealousy of Europeans still exists 
in that country; in Burmah, also, and even in Eashmir, there is 
an undercurrent of dislike t o  the presence of British o5cers. Why 
should we then insist on the compliance of the Afghans with a 
condition which it is clear is so repugnant to the feelings and pre- 
judices of the Chiefs and people? ' The time may come, and in the 
interests of humanity and civilization all will desire to hasten it, 
when the Afghans themselves may be willing to waive the objec- 
tion on which they have hitherto so strongly insisted, and when 
this wild fanatical people will be brought under the ameliorating 
influences which British rule exercises on the population of India. 
Much has been done within the last half-century, but there is still 
sufficient work to tax to the utmost British energies, and to satisfy 
British ambition, without adding more territory to our already 
overgrown Eastern Empire. It remains to recapitulate the points 
which it has been sought t o  establish in the foregoing pages. 
1st. That  the settled policy of former Administrations, com- 
posed of both parties in the State, in regard to the defence of the 
North- Western fronticr of India, has been, without sufficient 
cause, departed from by Lord Lytton, acting under instructions of 
the present_Ministry. 
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2nd. That the danger apprehended horn Russian aggression 
has been greatly exaggerated, and that the measures adopted in 
consequence are calculated to prejudice the best interests of our 
Indian Empire. 
3rd. That the hasty, inconsiderate action of Lord Lytton pre- 
cipitated hostilities, and led to an unnecessary, impolitic, and 
unjust war. 
4th. That any annexation of Afghan territory mould increase 
our political and financial difficulties, and entail a grievous burden 
OR the revenues of India. 
5th. That an attempt to secure more effectual hold on the 
passes lying between our border line and afghanistan, and to 
coerce the mountain tribes by placing military posts in their fast- 
nesses, would fail in its object, except at a cost too burthensome to 
be sustained. 
6th. That the expenses of the present mar will far exceed the 
estimate of the Government, and that in the impoverished state 
of India, increased taxation may be attended with most serious 
results. 
The essential condition of progress and improvement in 
India is the continuance of peace. However erroneous the policy 
enjoined by Lord Salisbwry, it is ~ossible that more temper, 
prudence, and forbearance, on the part of Lord L~.tton, might 
have averted its worst consequences. I n  Lord Lytton's hanh it 
culminated in war, and it contains the germs of future mars- 
Mr. GFladstone wrote of our Indian Empire, in a recent number of 
the Contem~orar~ Review :-'( This astonishing fabric was in the 
main built up by a mercantile Company, with secondary aid from 
the counsels and control of the Government, and under the 
guidance of the practical good sense which is so remarkable in 
our countrymen, except when some peculiar Ate' bewilders and 
misleads them." again :-" The Company delivered India 
fiom the flighty genius of Lord Ellenborough, who leant to  the 
ostentatious policy that has lately received, upon more dangerous 
ground, a more serious development. The toleration they estab- 
lished was one only too wide. They boldly gave education to the 
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people. They established a Free Press half a century ago. They 
laid the foundation of the railway system. They discouraged t o  
the best of their ability aggression on the Native Princes and on 
neighbouring territories. Their policy was, in the best sense, 
Conservative, and at the time when they handed over their high 
office to the Ciovernment, there was not a point, in the whole of 
our case with India, at which we could say they had neglected 
duty or precaution, or had either feigned or courted dangers." 
The East India Company may well be proud of this meed of 
praise from England's greatest and noblest l i ~ g  Btatesman. 
I ts  calm, equable, sagacious, administration typified admirably 
English sobriety, moderation, and practical good sense. The 
names of its illustrious servants are enshrined in the foremost 
roll of English Worthies. Nr. Gladstone's allusion to the "flighty 
genius of Lord Ellenborough" suggests an apt ~a ra l l e l  to the dis- 
tinguishing feature of the intellectual constitution of the present 
Viceroy. I n  a letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated 21st 
January, 1844, conceived in the same spirit of pride and self-suffi- 
ciency which dictated Lord Lytton's haughty message to the b i r  
of Cabul, Lord Ellenborough, wrote of the Court of the Directors 
of the East India Company :-"I am satisfied. that if they were 
left to themselves they would lose the country in three months." 
I n  little more than three months the Court of Directors, in the 
interests of the good Government of India intrusted to their 
keeping by the nation, took upon themselves the grave responsi- 
bility of recalling Lord Ellenborongh fiom his high office. Par- 
liament and the people of England ratified the act. I t  may be 
confidently affirmed that, under the East India Company's direc- 
tion of Indian affairs, where party prejudices and psepossessions 
never intruded, Lord Lytton's impulsive action, disregard of estab- 
lished forms of procedure, and tendency to personal Government, 
would not have been lightly passed over. I n  the fulness of time 
it is believed that the practical good sense of the English nation 
will pronounce a just judgment on this second Afghan War, and i 
on the merits of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration. 1 
*page 419 of Lord Colchester'e " Indian Administrations of Lord Ellenborough." 
